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ABSTRACT
A Sturdy House Built on Shifting Soil: Separation of Powers 
Interpretations from the Bench
by
Michael Justin Sibley
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis explores the development of the separation of powers doctrine and its 
application by the United States Supreme Court. Its analysis will focus upon the six 
different approaches to the doctrine that the Court has employed over the past two 
himdred years. Moreover, it will show that these six methods of analysis; which include 
the textual, original intent, structural, institutional competence, historical practice, and 
values approaches, have often been mixed single cases.
The approach that is employed is these separation of powers cases often dictates 
their outcome. In many of these cases, a different approach may have led to a 
substantially different outcome. Thus, it will show that the doctrine has grown to have an 
ambiguous nature. This is both confusing and constraining to law makers and has led to 
the argument that the separation of powers doctrine no longer has a place in our modem 
political world.
ui
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CHAPTER I 
HISTORIC FOUNDATIONS
The separation of powers doctrine has long been considered one of the most 
fundamental and unique principles of the American Constitution. At the same time, it 
seems to be one of the most misunderstood. Debate continues today in regard to the 
original nature and intent of this mechanism. Moreover, it is highly contested whether or 
not the separation of powers, as it exists in the United States government today, is true to 
that purpose. Before examining whether current judicial analysis regarding the doctrine 
is in line with the functions that the framers of our Constitution had intended it, two 
fundamental questions must be answered: What is the relationship, if any, of separation 
of powers to the older concept of mixed government and what is the cormection between 
the organization of the government through separation of powers and the political goal of 
checks and balances? The answer to both of these questions can be discovered through 
an inquiry into the evolution of the separation of powers doctrine. In order to understand 
the separation of powers which is paramount to our Constitution, it is important to 
analyze the conceptual models from which it derived.
The theory of mixed government seeks to divide political authority on the basis of 
social classes, mixing within one government several different types of government.
1
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Although this mixture takes different forms, its intent is to create a balance which will 
provide political stability and protection against abuses of political authority. (Diamond 
in L. Strauss 1981,587) Institutions, social classes and principles that were believed to 
be inherent within these classes were combined in the hope of achieving a sensible 
balance. Essential to this balance was the prescribed relationship of the classes in the 
constitutional framework, and the role of each class within the governing process.
(Knight 1989,2).
In contrast to the more modem system of separation of powers that our 
constitutional framers devised, mixed government derives from classical Greek, Roman, 
and Medieval thought. In perhaps its earliest version, Plato proposed a combination of 
monarchy and democracy to achieve balance. In Laws. Book III, he notes that 'there are 
two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly said to be derived; and one 
of them may be called monarchy and the other democracy”. The balance which he 
believes to be crucial comes from the combination of fnendship, which is derived from 
democracy, with wisdom, from the monarch. (Plato 1952,672) In Plato’s view, 
moderation was the key to effective government, and when it was lost so were lost the 
rights of the individual citizen.
Drawing upon the teachings of his mentor, Aristotle wrote of the mixed regime, or 
polity in his Politics as the solution to discovering the most feasible form of government. 
His mixture was that of the oligarchs and the democrats, the few rich and the many poor 
but free. He believed that through this mixture, justice would be most fully obtained.
The “good man” would also be the “good citizen”, because of a coincidence of qualities 
that were both ethnically and politically appropriate.(AristotIe 1943,130) Moreover, he
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believed that it was only the mixed regime that would withstand the perversion of 
arbitrary power that was prevalent in the pure forms of government.
Aristotle claimed to have found a way in which citizens would rule for the good of 
all. Both classes of citizens would be accommodated, while both principles of 
legitimacy, rule by wealth and numbers, would also be satisfied. These factors being 
combined in one government would achieve political stability and thus, halt the cycles of 
political decay.(Diamond 1992,60)
According to this arrangement, each class possessed complete governing power. 
Each acted as if it alone had the final political decision making power, having an absolute 
veto over the other class. Each class was believed to contribute its own particular sense 
of justice to the system, benefiting the whole by achieving a moderate body of law. The 
mixed regime, as so described, thereby lacked any of the sense of give and take that is 
employed in modem systems of checks and balances.(Gwyn 1965,24)
Aristotle wrote of the "functions’ of government; however, those functions 
differed from our conception of legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Although 
Aristotle’s concept of “judging” was very similar to our judicial functions, his 
“deliberative” and “that of the magistrates” are quite different. “Magistrate” derives from 
the word “master”, and they were to act as rulers. “Executive”, on the other hand, 
originally meant only “him who follows out the laws”. Even more striking is the fact that 
deliberation for Aristotle included not only lawmaking, but also all strategic, policy and
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moral decisions of the regime. (Diamond 1992,62) Moreover, these functions could be 
shared by the different elements within the government. '
In Book III of his Politics. Aristotle redefines Plato’s true forms of government by 
stating that: “The true forms of government, therefore, are those which the one, or the 
few, or the many govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule 
with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are 
perversions.”(Aristotle 1943, 139) By adding a third element into the range of viable 
governments, Aristotle opened the door for a new view of the mixed regime. Aristotle, 
however, hardly deserves credit for the development of mixed government. The first 
developed tripartite combination gets presented in the Greek historian Polybius’ model.
Living in Rome when writing his Historv. Polybius confronted what he believed 
to be the natural cycle of govenunents (constitutions), from kingship to tyranny, from 
aristocracy to oligarchy, and from democracy to mob rule.(Knight 1989,3) His solution, 
based on the Spartan model, was to adopt a mixed regime that combined monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy. Moreover, Polybius was the first to connect the idea of a 
division of power with that of a mixed govenunent.
By dividing both the regime, and the power within that regime amongst particular 
institutions that were assigned to each class of citizen, Polybius believed that he could 
avoid the seemingly inevitable deterioration o f government that had plagued Rome. 
Particularly, he coordinated the monarchy with the consulate, giving two consuls the 
power of commanding the army, and directing the government. They had the power of 
life and death over citizens in time of war and had great powers in peacetime as well.
For example, the assembly and the magistrate both shared deliberative powers
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These consuls, however, could only serve one year terms with no possibility of being re­
elected for ten years. They were further constrained by the other consul, who held an 
absolute veto over any of their actions. The aristocracy was matched with the senate, 
who, made important decisions on both domestic and foreign policy. Finally, the 
democratic element was coordinated (but remotely) with the popular assemblies. Only 
citizen-soldiers were allowed to attend these assemblies and their decisions were only 
used in an advisory capacity by the senate. ( in L. Strauss 1981.416-7)
Although doomed to failure, this scheme which created the Roman Republic 
promoted the ideas of mixed government and separation of powers in two respects. First, 
it coordinated a need for the separation of various functions’ with the idea of successful 
government, thus, progressing from reliance upon the “moderation” proposed by both 
Plato and Aristotle. Secondly, it gave importance to the division of “legislative power” 
into a “bicameral” body that became a focal point of the eighteenth century statesmen 
who would devise our current separation of powers doctrine.
Cicero also speaks of the mixed regime as the best form of government. In his 
own words: “. . .  as in music, harmony is produced by the proportionate blending of 
unlike tones, so is a state made harmoniously by agreement between dissimilar elements 
brought about by a fair and reasonable blending o f the upper, middle and lower classes 
just as if they were musical tones.”( in Knight 1989, 3)’ He believed that this was true 
even though he writes after the fall of the Roman Republic. He faulted the government of 
the Republic not upon its mixed constitution, but rather, on his view that the kingship in
‘ This is quoted from On the Commonwealth, translated and edited by G. S. Sabine and 
S. B. Smith; Ohio State University Press; Columbus, OH; 1929.
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Rome had already begun to degenerate into a tyranny prior to the institution of the mixed 
regime. Further, he faults the people o f Rome for not seeing that “wisdom” has the 
absolute right to rule. He believes that if the “true aristocracy” had ruled the senate and 
that if the one man who was pre-eminent in wisdom and virtue had held the kingship, the 
mixed regime would have succeeded. Although he fails to adequately discuss how these 
“wise” men are to be found, his support of Polybius’ division of both the government and 
its power are clear.( in L. Strauss 1981,142)
After this period, the concept o f mixed government seems to have gone into 
something of a decline for about 1300 years. At that time Thomas Aquinas began to re­
examine the classic writings o f Aristotle. As he did, he considered the idea of a mixed 
regime. Although he favored the monarchy — under ideal conditions, he found that “the 
stability afforded by a combination of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy provided 
valuable tempering for a stable regime.”( in L. Strauss 1981,233)
During the later Middle Ages and in Renaissance times, mixed government was 
seldom referred to. When it was, it was done so only in passing. That is, with the 
exception of Machiavelli’s writings. Although in the Prince he advocates a powerful 
monarch to lead the state into a unified condition, he cites both the Spartan and Roman 
examples of mixed regimes favorably in the Discourses. This treatise, is a commentary 
on the works of the Roman historian, Titus Livy; who had drawn his conclusions from 
Polybius’ works. Machiavelli was quite impressed with the ancient Spartan government 
and its founding legislator, Lycurgus, for having combined three powers into one 
government. He believed that this government directly resulted in stability, tranquillity, 
and endurance for the regime. The prince, the nobles and the people brought the elements
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of the one, the few, and the many together into one mixed republic. Moreover, in 
Machiavelli’s view, this republican mixed regime was the government which was best 
suited for long term governance. This is contrary to the rule by one man which he 
advocates in the Prince, as that form of government is only appropriate for the founding 
stage of a state or for withstanding serious political crisis.
Machiavelli’s analysis of the mixed regime included several facets which where 
later employed by James Madison as he worked to perfect a scheme of separated powers 
in the American system. First, he advocated the importance of democratic elements in 
the mixture. Second, he defended the conflict and competition of opposing elements 
within society as a means of political stability. The mixture and coimterbalancing of 
classes is only of secondary interest to him. Instead, he focuses on the democratic ideal 
of political competence amongst “ordinary” citizens. Although he has a quite limited 
definition of who qualifies as a citizen, he nevertheless points the way toward political 
competitiveness as a source of governmental strength.(Germino 1972,45-56) This 
concept, more than any other set forth by Machiavelli will be embraced by James 
Madison in his vision for the American governmental structure.
Underlying each of these analyses of the mixed regime, from ancient to 
renaissance times are the theoretical concepts of mixture, balance, moderation, and 
justice. Contained in them are the values o f stability and permanence. These early 
speculators were searching for something that would be permanent, some form of 
government that could withstand the fluctuation, decay, and continual change that they 
perceived to exist within their world.
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Concern with the “cycles” of government led to their metaphorical idea that the 
state was a biological organism. This imagery of the state implied that “. . .  the parts had 
a prescribed, constitutional relationship and combined to make a clearly definable 
whole”. (Diamond 1992,60) It followed then that the process of change which plagued 
the “organic state” could only be halted by combining all of the classes o f people and 
kinds of government known to them into one mixed constitution. That way they would 
be able to counter any force that tried to throw the state out of balance.
To politic thinkers of the middle ages, an important image was that o f a neat and 
unchanging hierarchical order that encompassed the entire universe. This permanently 
fixed order, sometimes called the “great chain of being” (in L. Strauss 1981, 302) ran 
from God at the top all the way down to the lowest form of life. This was combined with 
a view of the universe as existing solely for man, with man at the center in every respect. 
Nature was thought to exist only for the sake of man, therefore, it was also thought to be 
immediately and fully intelligible to his reason.(Knight 1989,5) A similar idea was 
applied to the state, with a king at the top and the classes arranged in a hierarchical 
fashion beneath him. Through this worldview that there was a divine plan to the 
universe, theories of monarchical rule like the “divine right of kings” were fostered. In 
light of this, theories that involved the sharing of power at the apex of the government 
seemed to deceive the natural order of things. Thus, the idea of mixed government lost 
much of its earlier importance.
As governmental theories and other works of political science are inherently 
influenced by their author’s view of the world, it required the destruction of the Ptolemaic 
view of the universe upon which the “great chain of being” was based to remind political
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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thinkers of the mixed regime. The work of sixteenth century scientists such as Nicholas 
Copernicus, Johannes Kepler, and Tycho Brahe shattered this geocentric view. Their 
mathematical discoveries concerning the earth’s motion and astronomy, led Galileo to 
expand upon Descartes’ earlier conviction that mathematics held the key to the secrets of 
the natural world. At the same time, William Harvey’s study of the circulation of blood 
in the human body led many to view the body as a mechanical object. Although these 
findings conflicted with the early world view of a hierarchy with god at the top, they were 
justified by the work of Robert Boyle. Boyle, a chemist, worked zealously to combine the 
view of god as divine providence and the concept of the world as an immense clock-like 
machine. A machine that God had originally set into motion and which subsequently 
runs on its own.(Deustch 1963, 24)
Boyle’s concept of the world was still too radical for most religious zealots, but as 
that work was supplemented by Isaac Newton, it became more widely accepted. Newton 
conceived of God as the chief mechanic of the universe, the cosmic curator of Boyle’s 
Strasbourg clock, working to preserve the perfect status quo. (Deustch 1963, 26)
Newton’s notion o f balance helped change the normative assumptions that guided 
political order. This in turn, led to a shift away from mixed government and toward 
separation of powers as the organizing governmental principle.(Casper 1989,209) Like a 
clock, if the parts of government could be assigned a particular ftmction, they could be 
mechanically manipulated to keep the state in balance.
In this mechanistic model, the state is understood as an instrument created to 
perform certain functions. This is much different firom the earlier biological images in 
that they saw the regime as the essential base fi’om which all activities of society
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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emerged. As the new model took hold, the concept of the state ceased to be Inclusive of 
all activities. Thus, the political realm narrowed, eventually resulting in the concept of 
negative government. (Knight 1989, 17)
It has been observed that in spite of the momentous issues of the day in England, 
between the time of James Ts death in 1625 and the English Civil War in 1642, there was 
a poverty of political ideas. This was true in both the royal and the parliamentary camps.^ 
However, once the Civil War broke out, political and constitutional ideas began to pour 
out of England like never before. Among the doctrines attaining some prominence at that 
time was the separation o f powers. This doctrine arose out o f dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which the Long Parliament had been governing England. Most of the 
supporters of this new doctrine were not in favor of an independent executive - as the 
king had been. Instead they favored an executive that was both subordinate and legally 
responsible to the legislature. In short, they did not advocate the separation of the 
executive and legislative branches. Rather, they were very much concerned with 
controlling the Long Parliament’s ability to act in what modem political scientists would 
call a judicial capacity along with their legislative duties. This problem and its relation to 
the separation of powers seems to have had its origins in the mind of Leveller leader John 
Lilbume. At least, a first version of separation of powers can be seen in an anonymous 
pamphlet that has generally attributed to Lilbume, published in 1645."* (Gwyn 1965, 37)
 ̂For more on this, see Margaret A. Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution: An Essav in 
Constitutional and Political Thought in England. 1603-1645: Rutgers University Press; 
New Brunswick, NJ; 1949.
* There is a facsimile copy of this document in: W. Haller: Tracts on Libertv in the 
Puritan Revolution; vol. HI; New York; 1933; p. 257-307.
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Through Lilbume’s writings, one can see four defined views of the separation of 
powers doctrine/ The earliest can be found in his pamphlet, England's Birth-Right, as he 
posses a number of questions to “our learned Lawyers.” In the twelfth of these questions, 
he asks:
12. Whether it not be agreeable to Law, justice, equitie and conscience, 
and the nature of a Parliament mans place, that during the time of his 
being a member, he should lay aside all places of profit in the 
Common wealth, and tend only upon that ftmction, for which he was 
chosen.
In this “common interest version”(Gwyn 1965, 39) of the doctrine, Lilbume notes that if 
members of Parliament could not afford to support themselves in Parliament, then the 
medieval practice of payment being made to members should be restored. He believed 
that the possession of “great and rich Places” (positions) prevented members from 
pursuing the common interest, since such offices “bred factions and stopped men from 
speaking freely for the Common-wealth”, for fear that they may lose their offices. 
Thereby, he feared that Members o f Parliament would “set up an interest of their owne, 
destructive of that common Interest and Freedoms whereof the poorest free man in 
England ought to be the possessor.”(Gwyn 1965,39) This “common interest version” 
describes a separation of powers in which a legislator should not be allowed to hold an 
executive title. Its purpose was to assure that the legislator’s attention was properly 
focused on the common welfare of the citizens. Lilbume believed, as many still do today, 
that if  these legislators were allowed to put their private interests ahead of the common 
interests, then they were not properly performing their function as a Member of the
 ̂These four versions are defined by W. Gwyn in pages 39-51 in The Meaning of 
Separation of Powers. Similar definitions are found in M. J. C. Vile’s account.
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Parliament. Moreover, he believed that there needed to be formal regulations stipulating 
this as a “function” that Members were responsible to.
The argument for this separation of powers seems to have arisen from the recent 
enactment of the Self-Denying Ordinance. According to Oliver Cromwell, as he spoke 
on behalf of the Ordinance, military officers in Parliament were prolonging the war for 
their own advantage. (Cromwell 1989,43) Lilbume believed that a formal separation 
such as this would alleviate these abuses.
Another distinct separation of powers argument can be found in this same 
pamphlet. This argument, which arose from Lilbume’s own philosophical difficulties 
with Parliament, also involves his belief that executive officers should not be allowed to 
hold legislative positions. Originating an “accoimtability version” of separation of 
powers, Lilbume writes in England's Birth-Right that:
It is one of the most unjust things in the world, that the Law­
makers should be the Law executors, seeing by that meanes, if they do 
never so much injustice and oppression, a man may spend both long time, 
and all he hath besides, before ever he can get any justice against them, 
yes, and it may be, hazard he losse of his life too.
And therefore it were a great deal better for the Common-wealth, 
that all the executors of the Law should be such persons as doe not in the 
least belong to Parliament, that so may not be able to make any factions to 
save their Lives and Estates, when they doe injustice.
( in Gwyn 1965,40)
Separation of powers in this light, declares that government officials will be more 
accountable to the people of the state if they are confined from holding positions in more 
than one branch, or being responsible to more than one function. Lilbume believed that 
this would allow the citizen to be a check on the use of arbitrary power.
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To further define this separation o f power, Lilbume, in a later pamphlet entitled A 
Defiance to Tyrants attempts to lay out exactly what he believes should be the proper 
functions of Parliament:
The Parliaments worke is to repeale old Laws and to make new 
ones, to pull down old courts of justice and erect new ones, to make warre 
and conclude peace, to raise money and see it rightly and providently 
disposed of (but themselves are not to finger it) it being their proper work 
to punish those that inbezle and wast it, but if they should finger it and 
waste it, may not the kingdome easily be chetted of its treasure, and also 
be left without meanes to pimish them for it: and most dishonorable it is, 
and below the greamess of Legislators to stoop to be executors of the Law, 
and indeed it is most irrational and unjust they should, for if they do me 
injustice 1 am rob’d and deprived of my remedy, and my appeal it being no 
where to be made, but to them, whose work it is to punish all male or evill 
administrators of justice.
(in Gwyn 1965,43)
Within this definition of function lies two important points; first, that to satisfy 
this separation of powers, government must be administered under the law and to the 
letter of the law. Secondly, that legislative supremacy should govern the separation.
Thus, there would be no balance or check between the branches, only the letter of the law 
to maintain political boundaries, and the citizens to check that the law was being 
followed.
The third version of separation of powers that is brought to light by John 
Lilbume’s writings can be called the “rule of law version”. Although this is closely 
related to the “accountability version”, it is nevertheless distinct. In this account, as each 
power is separated and their functions defined, rules of law should be established which 
force individual members of the various branches to perform those functions. In other 
words, each individual Member of Parliament would be responsible for upholding the
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common welfare and the public interest, and held legally responsible for not doing so. He 
fails to clearly define how this would be implemented; however, he does believe that it 
would be another valuable check on government officials. (Gwyn 1965,43)
The final rendition of the doctrine that comes out of Lilbume’s pamphlets is the 
“efficiency version”.(Gwyn 1965,45) This version, which is most famously re-argued 
and developed by John Locke, explains how government can run more efficiently with 
the separation of the powers. Lilbume answers that as people find the work that suits 
them best, they should confine themselves to becoming experts at that job. If they do not, 
they will poorly execute their work and end up with an inferior product. Thereby, within 
the government, the Parliament should confine itself to its given functions, less the entire 
state suffer as a consequence.
For Lilbume and the Levellers, the doctrine of separation of powers became one 
of their most powerful ideological weapons for attacking what they considered to be 
Parliamentary tyranny. In March of 1649, both the monarchy and the House of Lords 
were abolished by the sixty remaining members of the House of Commons.® From then 
until their dissolution by Oliver Cromwell in 1653, the “representatives of the people in 
Parliament” were, in their own words “the supreme authority” in England. (Gwyn 1965, 
42) However, for Lilbume and the other Levellers, this unicameral body remained as 
tyrannical as the body that it had replaced. This was true because none of the necessary 
separations between the legislature and the executive had been adopted. Before long, his 
protests found him before the new executive branch o f the government, the Council of
® The House of Commons had been reduced to only 60 after Pride’s Purge in December,
1648.
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State. Standing trial for high treason in 1652, Lilbume was banished from England and 
condemned to die as a felon if he retumed.(Gwyn 1965,49)
Before leaving Lilbume and the Levellers, there are a few points that should be 
made about their idea of the separation of powers doctrine. Most importantly, their 
second Agreement of the People, published in 1648 and submitted to the Council of 
State, became the first written constitution to describe a mandated separation of powers 
doctrine. Although by today’s standards the separation called for was incomplete and 
vague, its importance to later documents is immeasurable. Secondly, the Levellers 
rejected the idea of the mixed monarchy, in that it was contraiy to republican principals to 
have one non-elected person serve as the head of the state for a nonspecific length of 
time. Their primary fear in this arrangement was the possibility of arbitrary power being 
wielded against the people. Finally, they agreed with the commonly held idea that the 
legislature should be superior to the executive. With this in mind, they provided no 
intergovernmental means of checking the power of the law making body/
Although the separation of powers doctrine owes its origination and propagation 
to John Lilbume, it lived past the fall of the Levellers. This is because many other 
republicans, including those who opposed other Leveller ideas, accepted it. John Milton 
employed it against the king having a negative in the legislative process. “In all wise 
nations,” he observed, “the legislative power and the judicial execution of that power, 
have been most commonly distinct, and in several hands; but yet the former supreme, the 
latter subordinate.” (Gwyn 1965,52)
’ For a full account o f the works of John Lilbume, see T. C. Pease; The Leveller 
Movement: Washington; 1916.
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To add to the doctrine, Milton favorably compared the Puritan Commonwealth to 
the system praised by Polybius for the power and grandeur of Rome. He believed that the 
success of the English government could be attributed to its mixed character. Personally, 
he advocated the “free Commonwealth” and rejected all monarchies. He thought that by 
combining Polybius’ ideas and the doctrine of separation of powers, he could achieve a 
balance in government. His plan called for magistracy or monarchy embodied in the 
Council of State, aristocracy in the Grand Council - or legislature, and democracy in the 
electoral process for local offices and for seats on the Grand Council.(Knight 1989, 8) 
Reiterating Aristotle’s theory, Milton believed that this mixture of the few who were 
concemed with their private interests and the many who were concemed with the 
common good would result in the rule of the “middle sort”. He thought that this 'middle 
sort” of man, being prudent, noble, and trustworthy, would embody his “true 
aristocracy”.( in L. Strauss 1981,419)
In 1654, a well-known Cromwellian pamphleteer named John Hall tried to use 
one of the Levellers’ own arguments against them to defend triennial parliaments.^ In the 
process, he defended their doctrine o f separation of powers. The Levellers’ had opposed 
infrequent sessions of the assembly on the grounds that they would allow the executive to 
escape accountability to the assembly. This would break down the separation of 
legislative and executive power. Hall used the same argument to claim that frequent 
sessions would allow the legislature to usurp the power of the executive. In Confusion
* Triennial sessions of Parliament only had to be called once every three years, and the 
Lord Protector could end the session at any time after five months.
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Confounded he clearly uses the Leveller’s rule of law version of the doctrine when he 
writes:
Let us then consider how impolitick and dangerous a thing it is for to have 
a Supreme Legislative Power alwayes sitting and exercising it self. For 
such great Assemblies, like high medicines, should be used very seldome, 
or but upon great extremity, otherwise they lose not onely their vertue and 
vigour, but grow dangerous and contemptible. Besides, Assemblies of this 
nature are only to make Laws, not execute them, for being unlimited, they 
are not fit to judge as inferiour Courts, nor is it reason to take away 
without evident necessity from any man, the benefit of Laws already 
established, it is to be added that the ends of their Calling being 
principally two, the making of Laws, and the imposition of Taxes, it is 
impossible to imagine that any Nation can be so constantly and perpetually 
vicious or ill-settled, as to need a perpetual Making of Laws, or so wealthy 
as to be able continually to be cajol’d into Taxes. Neither is it impossible, 
that men coming to know one another, may make factions; nay, do many 
exorbitancies to keep their Power in exercise.
(Gwyn 1965, 54)
Besides restating the Leveller argument. Hall seems to provide an insight into Locke's 
later doctrine that Legislative and Executive power should be separated because law 
takes a short time to make, yet is perpetual in its execution.
A much fuller account of the separation of powers can be found in John Sadler’s 
1649 work, the Rights o f  the Kingdom. In this work Sadler explains his belief that the 
original English Constitution had consisted of three estates, each of which possessed a 
specific governmental function. In accordance with the law of nature, the early English 
had placed the legislative power in the Commons, the judicial power in the lords, and 
the executive power with the king. He notes that this system worked well until it began 
to break down. As the Lord’s primary responsibility was to “Judg the King”, their 
efficiency in this depended on being separate from him. As they became dependent
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upon the king for titles, their efficiency broke down. Likewise, the Commons were 
then forced to take over part of the Lord's judicial responsibilities.
The breakdown of the separation that had existed led to many problems for the 
English government. The enumeration of these problems follows the Levellers theories 
in that there was a loss of efficiency in the government and a loss of accountability 
amongst the various estates. More importantly, Sadler also adds to the doctrine by 
touting the “balance of power version” of the doctrine. In expressing this, he proclaims 
that checks and balances had existed in this governmental structure, so that his readers 
could easily deduce the dangers of such a system. He believed that as it is man’s nature 
to look out for his private interests, an internally balanced system would inevitably lead 
to the cooperation of two or more of the branches at the expense of the Commonwealth. 
(Gwyn 1965, 55)
Perhaps the most complete example o f separation of powers during the 
Interregnum came from Isaac Penington, the Younger. In three pamphlets, A Word for 
the Commonweale ( 1650), The Fundamental R/gAr (1651), and Safety and Liberty o f  
the People (1651) he reacted to the threat of arbitrary power that was posed by the 
House of Commons after the abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords in
1649. Penington was a moderate constitutionalist who stressed the need to limit 
government officials through “set and known laws.” As William Gwyn notes: 
“Advocates of the separation of powers and the rule of law are sometimes criticized for 
being so concemed with limiting government to prevent the abuse of power that they 
have not left public officials enough power to achieve the legitimate ends of 
government.’’(Gwyn 1965,58) However, this seems not to be the case with Penington.
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Like Rousseau, Penlngton believes that laws should only be made when there is a
matter of obvious common interest. Likewise, he and many of his contemporaries
would be appalled at the extensive and continuous legislative activity of the modem
world. His views also paralleled those of Thomas Aquinas four hundred years earlier in
that he saw government as something that needed to change with the times.^
To implement his principles of the rule of law and separation of powers,
Penington makes explicit suggestions. So that the people would be represented as
much as possible he calls for frequent elections. Moreover, he believed that
representation should be equal in the sense that every county, city, and borough should
have representatives. Also, he thought that a written constitution was necessary to
prevent misunderstandings between the people and the Parliament. He believed that
such a constitution would also keep the Parliament within its proper functions. More
directly, he describes the elements that should be contained in this constitution in the
following excerpt from The Fundamental Right (23-4):
A clear distinction between the administrative or executive power, and the 
legislative or judicative: that as they have in themselves, so they may 
retain in their course, their clear and distinct natures, the one not 
intermixing or intermedling with the other: That the administrative may 
not intermingle it self, or medle with the legislative, but leave it to its own 
free course; nor the legislative with the administrative by any extemporary 
precepts, directions or injunctions, but only by set and known Laws.
Things which are severed in their nature must likewise be severed in their 
use and application, or else we cannot but fail of reaping those fruits and 
effects which we desire from them, and which otherwise they might bear, 
and we enjoy.
(Gwyn 1965,61)
See Summa Theoloeica. I-II, Q. 97, A. 1.
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It should be noted that Penington was an advocate of the mixed monarchy.
Moreover, he fully supported the idea of an executive veto. (Gwyn 1965,64) Though
never being able to fully answer to the critics of such a negative, he believed firmly that
balance in the government could not be achieved without it. It was questions like this
that would be left to future constitutionalists.
From 1653, when the army forced the much criticized Rump to dissolve, until
1660 when Charles II was restored to the throne, England underwent a series of
constitutional experiments. Summarizing the role of separation of powers during this era,
M. J. C. Vile writes:
By the year of the execution of Charles I . . .  the doctrine of the separation 
o f powers, in one form or another, had emerged in England, but as yet it 
was still closely related to the theory of mixed government. It had been 
bom of the latter theory but had not yet tom itself away to live an 
independent life.. .  The execution of the king, and the abolition of the 
House of Lords destroyed the institutional basis of the theory of mixed 
government and any justification of the new constitution which was to be 
framed for England would have to rest on a different theoretical basis.
(Vile 1967,40)
Both of the written constitutions of this period -  the Instrument of Government 
(December, 1653) and the Humble Petition and Advise (June, 1657) -  were defended on 
the basis of their separation of powers. (Wormuth 1949,68) However, both of these 
documents seem to lead England back towards a constitutional monarchy. Concluding 
the period, the royalist Sir Roger L’Estrange declared in his 1660 publication, A Plea For 
Limited Monarchy, that mixed monarchy far better achieved the separation of powers and 
assured civil liberty than any pure form of republican government. (Gwyn 1965,65)
After this time, the doctrine slipped into a temporary eclipse. It seems that the
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tremendous popularity of the doctrine of mixed monarchy overshadowed its reliance upon 
the “rule of law” and “accountability” versions o f separation of powers. Curiously, of the 
three major “republican” theorists who had been adults during the Interregnum and who 
could not have possibly been ignorant of the separation of powers doctrine, Algernon 
Sydney and Henry Nevile, did not use the doctrine. The third and most famous. John 
Locke, did.
Although his Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay is often criticized for 
only providing a logical analysis of the ftmctions of government rather than actually 
separating them,‘° the treatise taken as a whole seems the expunge the claim. Others, like 
Peter Laslett, think that Locke's acceptance of royal participation in the legislative 
process, his omission of the judicial ftmction, and his reliance on trust to provide for the 
proper ftmctioning of governmental power demonstrate that he was not talking about 
separation of powers. (Laslett 1979,142-60) However, as peviously shown through the 
works of the Commonwealth writers, these conditions do not necessarily preclude the 
separation of powers doctrine. Moreover, several parts of Locke's work clearly point to 
the fact that he was concerned about the separation o f powers.
In looking at Locke’s work, the often quoted Chapter XII needs to be taken in the 
context of the previous eleven. In chapters I through DC, Locke argues that men should 
obey government because it preserves them by providing “an established, settled, known 
law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong”. 
Secondly, it provides “a known and indifferent judge, with the authority to determine all
For more on this see the works of Louis Fisher, particularly The Politics of Shared 
Power: 1981.
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differences according to the established law.” Thirdly, it requires a “power to back and
support the sentence when right and give it due execution.”(Locke 1952, 53-4) He also
notes that if governments do not provide for these prerequisites of individual and public
good, they violate the trust put in them by the people. Therefore, they may be disobeyed.
Among such deficient governments are absolute monarchies, which frustrate the
possibility of achieving an impartial administration of the law because “he being
supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no
judge to be found,. . .  who may fairly and indifferently decide”. (Locke 1952,45)
Locke states that absolute monarchy is “inconsistent with Civil Society, and so
can be no Form of Civil Government at all.” (Locke 1952,45) The form of monarchy
that he advocated was that of the “moderate monarchy”, a legitimate form of government
in which “the Legislative and Executive power are in distinct hands.” (Locke 1952,62) It
is with these conditions in mind that chapter XU must be read. In paragraph 143, Locke
observes that because law-making requires little time while the execution of the law is a
continuous activity, ‘there is no need that the Legislative should be always in being, not
having always business to do.” This “efficiency version” argument follows the
aforementioned seventeenth century idea that Legislation was an exceptional activity.
However, he believed that long legislative sessions would result in more evils than the
waste of the legislator’s time.
And because it may be too great a temptation to humane frailty apt to 
grasp at Power, for the same Persons who have the Power of making laws, 
to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may 
exempt themselves from Obedience to the Laws they make, and suit the 
Law, both in its making and execution, to their private advantage, and 
thereby to come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the Community, 
contrary to the end of Society and Government: Therefore in all well
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order’d Commonwealth, where the good of the whole is so considered, as 
it ought the legislative Power is put into hands of divers Persons who duly 
Assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a Power to make 
Laws, which when they are done being separated again, they are 
themselves subject to the Laws, they have made; which is a new and near 
tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for public good.
(Locke 1952, 58)
In this sentence, Locke clearly emphasizes the “rule of law version” of the separation of 
powers doctrine. His emphasis on all people being held to the letter of the law adds 
strength to the argument that he was a supporter of the doctrine.
Much of the separation of powers controversy regarding this section of the treatise 
comes from Locke’s difficulty conceiving of a legislature being supreme, but at the same 
time being limited by a higher constitution to operating only through general rules or as a 
special court to try delinquent officials. For this reason, he stressed short legislative 
sessions. He believed that the legislature must “naturally” possess executive power 
whenever it met. Thereby, violating the separation o f powers whenever it chose to exert 
this power during meetings. He leaves us then, with the conclusion that men’s liberty is 
only secure and free when their legislatures are not in session. (Gwyn 1965, 76)
In the next section, while writing on the special position of the king in a mixed 
monarchy, he observes that when the supreme executive power was vested in a single 
person having a share in the legislative function, the supreme executive “has no distinct 
superior Legislative to be subordinate and accountable to, farther than he himself shall 
consent: so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit, which one may 
certainly conclude will be but very little.” (Locke 1952,60) This being the case, Locke 
seems to observe that short legislative sessions were not necessary to maintain the 
separation of powers in a moderate, mixed monarchy. (Gwyn 1965,76)
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Locke also invokes the “accountability version” of the doctrine when he writes 
that: “The Executive Power placed any where but in a Person that has a share in the 
Legislature, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleasure changed 
and displaced.” This is true even in the mixed monarchy, where, even though the king 
himself cannot be held accountable, all “other Ministerial and subordinate Powers” are. 
(Locke 1952,60)
Locke’s version of the three powers of government is defined as the legislative, 
the executive and the federative powers. In this schema, the executive looks over 
domestic concerns, while the federative is concerned with foreign affairs. Criticism of his 
argument comes in that he makes no attempt to separate these latter two powers and 
indeed declares that they should be held by the same man. (Locke 1952, 58) Moreover, 
he combines judicial activity with the executive ftmction. However, this does not deny 
the fundamental separation which he calls for between the executive and the legislative 
functions. Indeed, one of his conditions for enjoying liberty and security under 
government is the separation of the legislature and the executive; in the absence of this 
separation, he believes life and liberty will be even less secure than in the 
pregovemmental condition. (Knight 1989,9)
In discussing the historical and theoretical antecedents of the separation of powers 
doctrine, most scholars jump firom Locke’s 1690 work, to that of Montesquieu in 1748. 
There are however, three important scholars who added to the doctrine during this time.
At the turn of the seventeen century writers and politicians commonly referred to Old 
Whigs or Commonwealthsmen began to analyze the government of William HI. In doing 
so, they began to express their love for liberty and their distaste for arbitrary power.
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Probably the most influential statement of separation of powers at this time came from 
John Trenchard, who would go on to jointly author Cato's Letters with Thomas Gordon. 
In his preface to A Short History o f  Standing Armies in England, which dealt generally 
with matters of government, Trenchard condemns the abuses that had crept into the 
constitution.
His main contention was that the House of Commons had become corrupt by 
placemen who had been given membership by the king. He believed that as long as the 
Commons preserved its independence, its interest would be “so interwoven with the 
Peoples, that if they act for themselves (which every one of them will do as near as he 
can) they must act for the common interest of England.” He adds that in the past, if a few 
members were to abuse their authority, they would have been punished by the rest. 
Unfortunately, beginning with the reign of Charles I, the king had begun to use public 
officials to influence voting in the House. Recently, the number of offices had been so 
multiplied that the Constitution and English liberty were in great danger. His view of 
separation of powers entailed that it would be fatal to have too many placemen in 
parliament:
for all wise governments endeavour as much as possible to keep the 
Legislative and Executive Parts asimder, that they may be a check upon 
one another. Our government trusts the King in no part of the Legislative 
but a Negative Voice, which is absolutely necessary to preserve the 
Executive. One part of the Duty o he House of Commons is to punish 
Offenders, and redress the Grievances occasion’d by the Executive Part of 
the Government; and how can that be done if they should happen to be the 
same Persons, unless they would be publick-spirited enough to hang or 
drown themselves? ( in Gwyn 1965, 85)
This preface, often called the “incomparable preface”, deserves its praise in that it
summed up Whig constitutional thought of the eighteenth century so well. Trenchard’s
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version of separation of powers first shows the negative effect that association with 
mixed monarchy had had upon the doctrine. Secondly, it begins to develop the more 
modem idea of checks and balances out of the older accountability argument.
Henry St. John Bolingbroke, one of the leading Tories of his day, took over many 
of the “Old Whig” principles and advanced the separation of powers doctrine. He did so 
in The Craftsman, an anti-ministerial newspaper aimed at unseating Robert Walpole. 
Although his writings in this paper are the subject of great debate amongst political 
scholars in regard to whether or not he supported separation of powers, his work was 
nevertheless indisputably important to the doctrine.
Bolingbroke’s novel observation that liberty is more endangered in a mixed
monarchy than in a republic inspired later theorists, including Montesquieu. He justified
his claim upon the fact that magistrates in a republic are under continual control and are
appointed for short terms, their actions being subject to future revisions." Further, he
combined the ideas of separation of powers ( “independency” ) and the idea of checks and
balances ( “dependency” ) by saying that they were simply two aspects of the same
constitutional arrangement; balanced government.
The constitutional Dependency, as I have call’d it for Distinction’s Sake, 
consists in this; that the Proceedings of each Part of the Government, when 
they come forth into action and affect the whole, are liable to be examin’d 
and contrould by the other Parts. The Independency pleaded for consists 
of This; that the Resoulutions o f each Part, which direct these Proceedings, 
be taken independently and without any Influence, direct or indirect, on the 
others. Without the first, each Part would be at Liberty to attempt 
destroying he Ballance, by usurping, or abusing Power; but without the 
last, there can be no Ballance at all.
(in Gwyn 1965,95)
' ' The Craftsman, Vol. IE, p. 12. In Gwyn, p. 93
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As it has been well documented, Montesquieu knew Bolingbroke and became very
familiar with The Craftsman during his visit to England in 1729-1731. (Cohler 1989, XV
- in Montesquieu) Moreover, it is obvious that these ideas were translated into his The
Spirit of the Laws, in 1748.
Writing in opposition to The Craftsman, ministerial writer James Pitt -  under the
pseudonym “F. Osbourne” -  assailed Bolingbroke week after week in the London
Journal. Nonetheless, he too added to the separation of powers doctrine and
Montesquieu’s view of English government. In rejecting the claim that the king should
have no hand in legislation Pitt writes:
Our Constitution consists indeed of Three Powers absolutely distinct; but 
if it were also as absolutely independent, no Business would ever be done:
There would be everlasting Contention and Dispute till one had got the 
better o f the other, ‘Tis necessary, therefore, in Order to the due Exercise 
of Government, that these Powers which are distinct, and have a Negative 
on each other, should also have a mutual Dependence, and Mutual 
Expectations.
(Gwyn 1965,98)
This “constitutional dependent independency” that Pitt speaks of was much preferred to 
Bolingbroke’s independency. In addition, it foreshadowed the complaint of later critics 
of the separation of powers who have attacked the doctrine for creating governmental 
deadlock and inefficiency. Pitt’s most important point, however, lies in the fact that the 
version of separation of powers that he rejected, refused to allow the executive a 
coordinate part in the legislature. He believed that this would discourage the cooperation 
between the legislature and executive needed for effective government and promotion of 
the common good.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
There is no one theorist who is more closely related with the separation of powers 
and checks and balances, than Montesquieu. However, the question remains as to 
whether Montesquieu’s work was a novel venture, or if he merely dealt with existing 
theories in a more systematic fashion. In truth, both novelty and systematic summary can 
be seen in a book that is as much a journey through the development of a theory as it is 
theory itself.
One of his goals in writing The Spirit of the Laws was to discover the 
constitutional principles which best promoted political liberty. To discover this, he 
looked to the English Constitution, which he believed to be the only one in the world 
having liberty as its chief objective. The chapter on the Constitution of England begins 
with a classification of the division of power that is reminiscent o f John Locke. He 
declares that “In each state there are three sorts of powers: legislative power, executive 
power over the things depending on the right of nations, and executive power over things 
depending on civil right.” (Montesquieu 1989,156) Invoking Locke’s legislative, 
federative, and executive powers respectively, Montesquieu goes on to rename the latter 
two powers, “the executive” (federative) and the power of judging (executive). It is odd 
that he puts this classification at the beginning of the chapter, as the one which he goes on 
to employ is quite different.
His second classification, in which the power of judging is truly independent and 
the executive becomes responsible for both domestic and foreign affairs is unique to 
Montesquieu. It is worth noting, however, that at the time of his trip to England in 1728 
it was common practice that those who acted as judges in civil and criminal cases would 
not be allowed to exercise either legislative or other executive functions. This was true
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despite the fact that they were part of the executive arm of the government. (Gwyn 1965, 
101)
The legislative power, according to Montesquieu, is the activity of declaring “the 
General will of the state,” and to inform the people of their general obligations towards 
one another. This power should be held by the body of all citizens, for in a free state 
“every man is supposed to be a free agent out to be governed by himself.” Albeit, an 
argument for popular sovereignty, Montesquieu placed three limitations on the reign of 
the people. First, as a large mass of people are unfit for discussing public affairs, they 
should elect representatives to act as legislators. Secondly, those who are in “so mean a 
condition that they are accounted to have no will of their own” should be excluded from 
suffrage. Finally, since “persons distinguished by birth, riches, or honors” will in every 
society always be in a minority, they should be protected. If they are not protected, they 
will be exploited by the masses. Thus, there should be an aristocratic as well as a popular 
chamber in the legislature. Each of these checking the threatened encroachments of the 
other. (Montesquieu 1989, 176)
The legislature was to perform the traditional English legislative duties with one 
glaring addition. They were also “to examine in what matmer the laws that it has made 
have been executed. This function seems to include the power of calling public officers 
to account and potentially impeach them. (Gwyn 1965,102) If this were true, it stands at 
odds with the English example, in that constitutionally, the king could not be held 
accountable for his actions by the legislature.
The “executive power”, which broadens by the end of Book XI, Chapter 6 to 
include all foreign and domestic affairs, is that of “executing the public resolutions”
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embodying the will of the legislature. Montesquieu defines the executive as consisting 
“more in action”, and hence, directs the army and navy. As was the tendency of the 
English writers of the day, Montesquieu saw the executive as primarily a foreign affairs 
position. This may account for his two seemingly different variations of the division of 
power.
Montesquieu saw the judicial ftmction as the most dangerous to liberty. This was 
so because he believed that although the legislature could pass a law and the executive 
could put it into effect, it had no bearing on the individual citizen until a judicial decision 
had been made. In this case, he uses the English system as a model, and thereby notes 
that guilt or innocence was decided by other citizens. Therefore, the people may fear the 
judicial office, but they need not fear the men who hold that position. (Montesquieu 1989, 
180) This view of the primacy of petty juries, however, does not do justice to the role of 
Judges in the system.
Besides the distinct definition of functions and separation of powers that 
Montesquieu employs, he is also very intrigued by the doctrine of balanced government. 
(Gwyn 1965,108) He gave great importance to England’s mixed constitution and its use 
of checks and balances. Moreover, he saw these as two of the institutional prerequisites 
of liberty in the English system. English constitutionalists like Trenchard and 
Bolingbroke were so taken by the idea of balanced government that they revised the 
separation of powers doctrine. Their versions separated the legislative and executive 
functions in an arrangement which would allow these two parts of the government to 
check one another’s activities. According to this position, the separation of powers is 
simply one aspect of balanced governmental institutions.
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Although influenced by its merits, Montesquieu did not adopt this position.
Instead, he developed the two doctrines separately. He did so to show that they were both
necessary to assure political liberty. The difference between the two is demonstrated by
the differences in two sections of The Spirit of the Laws. In Book XI, Chapter 6 he sums
up his separation of powers doctrine by saying:
All would be lost if the same man or the same body of leaders, either of 
the nobles or of the people exercised these three powers: that of making 
laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging criminal 
and civil cases.
(Montesquieu 1989, 165)
This is a doctrine that is totally different from his summary of checks and balances in the
English government.
Here then is the fundamental constitution of government of which we are 
speaking. The legislative body being composed of two parts, the one 
restrains the other by the mutual power of rejection. They are both bound 
by the executive power, which itself is bound by the legislative. These 
three powers are inclined to form a state of repose or inaction. But as they 
are obliged to move by necessary movement o f human affairs, they are 
forced to move in concert.
( Montesquieu 1989,160)
The three powers mentioned in this doctrine are clearly different from the three in the 
previous paragraph. In keeping with the theory of mixed constitution, Montesquieu 
insisted that the aristocracy and the common people be given a coordinate part in the law 
making process. This idea, essential to mixed government, has nothing to do with 
separation of powers. According to Montesquieu, it is nonetheless another prerequisite to 
political liberty. While this account of the checks and balances o f the English 
Constitution introduces powers unknown to the separation o f powers doctrine, it also
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omits a power which forms the essential third branch o f Montesquieu’s division of
power. This omission may be explained in the following excerpt:
Of the three powers of which we have spoken, the judicial is in a sense 
nothing. There remain only two; and as they are in need of a regulating 
power to moderate them, the part of the legislative body composed of the 
nobility is very proper to produce this effect.
(Montesquieu 1989, 176)
This can be further explained by recalling that Montesquieu’s vision of the judiciary was 
primarily that of the petty jury. As this body was continually changing membership, it 
could hardly be relied upon to keep the government in balance. Besides, to bring the 
judiciary into the equation would be to contradict the English government that he so 
admired.
In spite of viewing these doctrines as two separate entities, he also saw important 
relationships between them. (Cohler 1988, 86) As experience had taught, possessors of 
power will strive for more power unless checked by other power holders. Thereby, 
separation of powers could only survive if it were accompanied by checks and balances. 
This was true for both the legislature and the executive. If the legislature were 
unchecked, the fact that they are not limited by law would allow them to destroy the 
liberty of the people. On the other hand, if they could not check the executive, “the 
people could never obtain any satisfaction for the injustices done to them.” (Montesquieu 
1989, 162)
Secondly, he believed that they were tied together by the use of the executive 
veto. This negative allowed the executive to check the legislature. However, because of 
the separation of powers, he had no right to amend any proposal. Thus, constrained in his 
function, the executive could only prevent change and encourage stability.
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Montesquieu’s logical analysis of these principles was probably his greatest 
contribution to the separation of powers doctrine. He took the varied writings and ideas 
from Polybius to the contemporary English theorists and created a complete product. 
However, the escape of separation of powers from mixed monarchy was incomplete. For 
it to truly stand on its own legs it had to cross the Atlantic Ocean. There, as its ideas were 
merged with the experiments in constitutional government that were occurring in the 
colonies, it would grow to maturity.
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CHAPTER II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN AMERICA
“At Present”, wrote Dr. William Douglas of Boston in his Summary o f Historical
and Political development o f the British settlements in North America, The governments
of the colonies in British North America:
in conformity to our legislature in Great Britain . . .  consist of three 
separate negatives; thus, by the governor, representing the King, the 
colonies are monarchical; by the Council, they are aristocratical; by a 
house of representatives or delegates from the people, they are 
democratical: these three are distinct and independent of one another, and 
the colonies enjoy the conveniences of each of these forms of government 
without their inconveniences, the several negatives being checks upon one 
another. The concurrence of these three forms of government seems to be 
the highest perfection that human civil government can attain to in times 
of peace . . . ;  if it did not sound too profane by making too free with the 
mystical expressions o f our religion, 1 should call it a trinity in unity.
(Bailyn 1965,59)
Although his comments comparing colonial governments to the holy trinity were 
condemned as the “most complete and undisguised system of atheism that was ever dared 
to be published in a Christian country” by the Boston Weekly News Letter his 
comparison of those governments to England’s constitution was very indicative of the 
thinking of the times. There was a fundamental belief in both America and in Great 
Britain that a direct correspondence existed between the English constitution and the 
governments in the colonies. This idea gained speed in America from the conjunction of
34
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two independent developments. On the one hand, we find the appearance almost 
everywhere in the colonies of bicameral legislative bodies. This came about, not as a 
response to constitutional theories, but, as a way to deal with the immediate needs and 
problems in their localities. (Bailyn 1965, 60) On the other hand, in England of the 
concept of mixed government was generally accepted in the terms laid down by Charles 
the first in his Answer to the XIX. Propositions o f  Both Houses o f Parliament (1642). 
(Lutz 1988,20)
By the early eighteenth century English constitutional theory was commonly 
applied to American institutions. In all three types of colonies; royal, corporate, and 
proprietary, there existed a single executive. The lower houses of the colonial legislatures 
came to be associated with the local, popular interests. At the same time the upper houses 
or “colonial councils” appeared to resemble the House of Lords. Although both Crown 
and propriety officials down played the idea that the colonial institutions were analogous 
to England’s Parliament, they still helped to recreate the system of mixed government in 
America. Moreover, they believed that time would narrow the differences between the 
two constitutional systems. (Bailyn 1965,62)
By mid-century, it was clear that the formal organs of government and the 
constitutional structure of the colonial communities were strikingly similar to England’s. 
However, there was also something fundamentally different about their operation. While 
the mixed and balanced constitution in England seemed to produce a high degree of 
public harmony and the peaceful integration of political forces, similar institutions in the 
colonies created the opposite. Within the provincial governments there was persistent
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and often bitter strife. There was conflict first of all, between the executives and the 
legislatures. Their battles were so constant that they became more noteworthy when they 
were absent, than when they were present. Furthermore, they were so intense that they 
often lead to the total paralysis o f the government. ITie conflict, however, did not reside 
entirely within the government. Rather, a factionalism existed that transcended 
institutional boundaries and at times reduced the politics of certain colonies to an almost 
absolute chaos between competing groups. (Lutz 1988,66)
These conflicts resulted from what eighteenth century politicians called the role of 
power in government and what we, today, more commonly refer to as the role of the 
executive. Legally, in all but the two charter colonies of Rhode Island and Connecticut, 
the power of the executive was far stronger than it was in England. The governors in the 
royal and proprietary colonies held the power of an absolute veto over the colonial 
legislatures. Those legislatures were further limited by the fact that the Privy Council or 
the proprietors in England could also disallow their legislation. The governors and the 
Privy Councils used this power, which no English monarch had used over the Houses of 
Parliament since 1707, fi'equently and on the most sensitive issues. (Wood 1969, 29) 
Moreover, the use of the executive veto over colonial legislation continually increased as 
a result of three factors. First, orders were sent fi’om England to the colonial governors 
spelling out mandatory vetoes over whole categories of legislation.
Secondly, the area of prerogative power that had been significantly reduced in 
England after the Glorious Revolution was reproduced in the colonies in all of its archaic 
force. The royal governors generally had the power to prorogue and dissolve the lower
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houses of the Assembly, and they became accustomed to using these powers freely. In 
most of the royal colonies, there was no minimum frequency with which the Assemblies 
were required to meet and no minimum time length of time for their sessions. Indeed, 
they lacked the self-determination of the English House of Commons and were dependent 
upon the executive will for their very existence. (Bailyn 1965,68)
Thirdly, and perhaps most interestingly the executive in the colonies had powers 
over the judiciary which were explicitly denied the crown in England. The English Act of 
Settlement of 1701, which created permanent tenure for crown appointed judges was 
determined to be inoperable in the colonies. Not only were judges at all levels, from 
justices of the peace to chief justices of the supreme courts, appointed only upon 
nomination by the governors, but they were also dismissible at the governor’s command. 
Similarly, the executive could create courts without statutory empowerment. While it 
was true that both the governors and the home governments accepted tribunals created by 
the colonial legislatures, they never gave up their authority over the creation of courts.
These prerogative tribunals that were created by the colonial governors through 
their powers as chancellor offended the colonists on many fronts. Most notably, they sat 
without juries and made decisions that were as binding as legislation. Furthermore, they 
were concerned with such unpopular matters as the collection of arrears on quit rents. 
(Wood 1969, 72)
Along with a variety of lesser powers, including power over the elections of 
speakers of the lower houses of the legislature (Lutz 1988,28), these three areas of legal 
power that the executive in the colonies held were seen to be the most threatening to
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individual liberty. Official explanations were offered to the colonists for this non­
conformity in the re-creation of England’s mixed and balanced constitution in America, 
nevertheless, those who were committed to the idea that the colonists should enjoy the 
full benefits of English citizenship saw the anomalies between the two constitutions as 
unbearable. (Bailyn 1965, 71)
These arbitrary and threatening executive powers were sources of political 
controversy in the colonies. They tended to mobilize the forces associated with the 
legislature against those associated with the executive. However, what assured the actual 
conflict of these forces even more than the exaggeration of the executive authority was 
the array of other circumstances that effectively tumed these executives into pawns of a 
higher authority. Moreover, although the colonial constitutions were archaic by 
eighteenth century standards in important respects, these circumstances led them to be 
radically reformed in other respects.
The political influence of government was weak in the colonies because the 
executive lacked the flexibility it needed for successful engagement in politics. (Wood 
1969,64) The royal governors arrived in the colonies with a commission that outlined 
their duties and with an explicit instruction book. This book filled in the details so 
minutely and with such finality that in many of the most controversial and sensitive 
public issues they were left politically immobilized. The result was that on many of these 
issues, the executive position was so rigid and prescribed that it was easily anticipated by 
the legislatures. Thus, though they were legally stronger than the assemblies, the 
governors were by this fact alone politically weaker.
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Patronage, which had been one of the most effective weapons of leaders like 
Walpole in England to combat against the democracy in mixed government was prevalent 
in the colonies at the beginning of the provincial period. In the course of half of a 
century, however, it was so ground away by the forces at either extreme of the political 
spectrum that ultimately the governors were left without “the means of stopping the 
mouths of the demagogues.” (Bailyn 1965, 72) Through this competition, the colonial 
governments began to see distinct and separate functions being attended to by these two 
branches of government. The judiciary, on the other hand remained tied to one o f the 
other two branches in terms of both its existence and its function.
Formal separation of these functions began with the adoption in the colonies of 
Place Acts. The New Jersey Place Act of 1730 copied the exact wording of the English 
Place Act of 1707, but then added:
That every person who, by reason of any office, pension, or salary 
firom the crown, are by the laws of Great Britain disabled to be elected or 
to sit or vote in the House of Commons there, shall be and are hereby 
disabled to be elected or to sit or vote in any house of Representatives 
hereafter to be summoned in this province. . .
(Lutz 1988,63)
In Virginia the principle was taken even further, to the extreme position long since 
defeated in England, o f flatly excluding all executive officeholders fi'om seats in the 
lower house whether or not their constituents were willing to re-elect them after their 
appointment. (Wood 1969,19) These provisions, incorporated after Independence in the 
first state constitutions, have been perceived by many as a clear expression of the 
American doctrine of separation of powers. In fact, none of these provisions was written 
in regard to that doctrine as we now imderstand it. They derive instead fi’om an
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intellectual context that was not concerned with the balance of functioning branches of 
government, but with the concept of perfecting mixed government. Their primary focus 
was to control the dangers of influence and corruption that infected the English system. 
(Gwyn 1965, 113)
The separation of powers along functional rather than class lines started to 
become a core concept of constitutionalism in America about the time of the American 
Revolutionary War. However, as Philip Kurland concludes: “The inefficacy of resorting 
to a general notion of separation o f powers to resolve contests between two branches of 
government has long since been demonstrated by our history.”(Kuriand 1986,608)
Despite this “inefficacy” as soon as the Declaration of Independence was signed, we 
became dedicated to the awesome task of defining exactly what the “Legislative”, 
“Executive”, and “Judicial” powers were so that we could keep them separate.(Casper 
1997,26)
Actually, the reference to separation of powers as a general normative principle of 
American constitutionalism began in tandem with the writing of the state constitutions. 
Some of its earliest references come from the respective “bills of rights” that were put 
into law in Maryland and Virginia. Article VI of the Maryland Declaration of Rights of 
1776 provides “that the legislatuive, executive and judicial powers of government ought 
to be forever separate and distinct from each other.” (Wormuth 1949, 112) In Virginia’s 
Bill of Rights the wording is even more explicit. It states that “The legislative, executive 
and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the 
powers properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more
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than one of them, at the same time.’X Wormuth 1949, 113) Other states which adopted 
similar phrases into their constitutions included Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
North Carolina.
All of these constitutions saw a link between the separation of powers and the idea
of “liberty”. That linkage was most probably provided by the writings of Montesquieu.
In The Spirit o f the Laws, he writes that:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, 
or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because 
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch should enact tyrannical 
laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated 
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the 
judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, 
the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
(Montesquieu 1989,47)
With this in mind, the founding fathers in the various states saw that they had a difficult
task at hand. As the systems of government that had developed in the colonies had been
most closely related to the “mixed regime” in England, they were confronted with the
challenge of using the system that they had become accustomed to and basing it upon
popular sovereignty. (Adams 1980,213-15) The issue was no longer the separation of
differently based powers, but the separation of power that flowed from one source: the
people. If the separation of powers was indeed a necessary condition of liberty, the tme
task was to reconcile it with the popular sovereignty that was being explicitly and
dramatically invoked by the majority of the new state constitutions and which was itself
the foremost expression o f that liberty. (Casper 1997,11)
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In Gordon S. Wood’s award winning book. The Creation o f  the American 
Republic, 1176- 1787, he explains how truly formidable the task of dividing power was 
for the newly free states. He believes that “Overnight modem conceptions of public 
power replaced older archaic ideas of personal monarchial government. . .  As sovereign 
expressions of the popular will, these new republican governments acquired an 
autonomous public power that their monarchial predecessors had never possessed or even 
claimed . . .  In other words, did it any longer make sense to speak of negative liberty 
where the people’s positive liberty was complete and supreme?” (Wood 1969,132, 135) 
This situation left the framers of the state constitutions to sort out exactly how to protect 
the people as citizens from the people as rulers. (Black 1969, 76) They, further, had to 
resolve whether or not the stmctiues of government would be hierarchically organized. 
Finally, they had to decide how and if the system of separated powers would be integrated 
with its apparent contradiction -  checks and balances. (Kiuland 1986, 607)
Overall, as the separation of powers doctrine was implemented into the first state 
constitutions from 1776 to 1787 one thing stands out -  how extremely weak those 
versions of the doctrine are. Most of them simply made distinctions between the three 
branches and enumerated areas in which the powers of each were not supposed to reach. 
However, they left vast areas of undefined territory where the three branches were left to 
overlap and compete for power. The most distinct of these areas was the amount of 
dependence that the executive had on the legislature. (Casper 1997,13)
This dependence can be clearly seen on four levels. First, only in New York, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire were the executives elected by the voters. Even so,
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in the latter two states the choice reverted to the legislature if no candidate received a 
majority of votes in the popular election. As it was seldom that there was but one or two 
candidates running for the position of governor, this rarely failed to occur. The other 
constitutions granted the legislature the power to elect the governor or president, typically 
on an annual basis. This left the executive at the annual control of the legislature. If he 
were to stay in office, his first loyalty had to be to the desires o f the legislative body. The 
state of Pennsylvania tried to get aroimd this predicament by having the executive chosen 
jointly by the legislature and “the supreme executive council”, which was popularly 
elected. (Bondy 1897,43) Their efforts, though unique, failed to keep the executive from 
having to show loyalty to their legislative selectors.
Secondly, only Massachusetts and New York recognized an overridable executive 
veto. Even with this, the veto power in New York was held by the Coimcil of Revision 
inside the legislature. The other states either recognized no veto power or so limited the 
power that it did not serve as a check upon the legislature.
Third, all of the states called for an executive or privy council that was elected by 
the legislature. These councils served to advise the executive and in many cases 
effectively prostrated him by having to approve his decisions before they went into 
effect.'^ This once again left the executive as subordinate to the legislature.
It should be noted that South Carolina’s first constitution split legislative power 
between the executive, the assembly and legislative coimcil. The executive thus had an 
absolute veto. This constitution had a very short life.
In New York, the system was very complicated, but allowed the govemor a great deal 
of autonomy.
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Fourth, the traditional power of appointment that modem Americans so associate 
with the executive was nearly taken out o f his control. In most of the states, either the 
legislature had the sole power of appointment or it was given to the privy council that 
they had already appointed. Only for very minor positions did the governors have any 
control over the appointment.(Fisher 1981,24)
In order to add insult to injury, even though governors were authorized to exercise 
the “executive powers of government”, subject to council participation, they were 
confined to exercising those powers in accordance with the laws of the state. (Rakove 
1996,250) Virginia even added to this by stating that the governor “shall not, under any 
pretense, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute or custom in 
England.’’(Crosskey 1981, 342) This made the state legislature the sole and ultimate 
power that the governors were to respect.
Within the first years of their existence, many of the state constitutions of 1776 
met with criticism for their lack of adequate separation of powers. In 1777 New York 
amended its constitution to provide for more separation of the branches. In 1778, the new 
draft o f the Massachusetts constitution was rejected on the basis of complaints lodged by 
the towns of Essex County. The Essex Result of 1778 was a detailed critique of the new 
document that admonished its authors for both the lack of “proper” executive authority 
and the intermingling of executive, legislative and judicial powers. (Handlin 1966, 324) 
The Essex Result stated, in part, that; “A little attention to the subject will 
convince us, that these three powers ought to be in different hands, and independent of 
one another, and so ballanced, and each having a check upon the other, that their
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independence shall be preserved.” (Handlin 1966, 337) The insight that checks and 
balances were needed to maintain the independence of each of the branches revived the 
concept of balanced government. It did not, however, realize the complexity that the idea 
of combining “checking” and “separating” would cause. The problem had changed from 
the one that they knew in England, primarily because they were separating the power that 
flowed from one source -  the people. In England, the problem was simpler because they 
were merely balancing the various factions within the organization of government.
(Casper 1997, 14) In its newly added Bill of Rights, Massachusetts’ Constitution of 1780 
attempted to attack the problem. Its wording, which became the prototype for other 
states, stated the principle in these terms: “All power residing originally in the people, 
and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested 
with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, 
and are at all times accountable to them.”‘‘*
The Bill of Rights in the 1784 New Hampshire constitution expressed a clear 
separation of powers. However, it added the idea that neither separation of powers nor 
checks and balances could supply a neat formula of arrangements that would keep proper 
governmental organizational arrangements automatically in line. Article XXXVIl o f that 
document shows a deeper appreciation of the complexity of the problem than other state 
constitutions when it declares that: “In the government of this state, the three essential 
powers of thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive and judicial, ought to be kept as 
separate from and independent of each other, as the nature of free government will admit.
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, Article V
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or as consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the 
constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.’’(Adams 1980,216)
As Merrill Jensen notes, although this provision obviously views the separation of 
powers as an essential part of free government, it also notes how the concept of separate 
and independent powers is limited by the notion of free government. The necessity of 
maintaining “the whole fabric of the constitution” requires that separation, coordination, 
and cooperation are all met to the necessary level. The definition of these levels would 
prove to be one of the most complex issues for the federal constitutional convention as 
they tried to implement the separation of powers doctrine.(Jensen 1950, 353)
As the states wrangled with the concept of separations of powers, the central 
government nearly avoided the issue. Although formal political parties did not exist 
during the Revolution, there were broad differences of opinion on the subject of a central 
government. Radical republicans generally trusted their state governments and had a 
marked distrust for any distant central authority. Conservatives, on the other hand, hoped 
to construct a strong central government that could regulate trade, control western lands, 
settle interstate disputes, and protect property rights. (Jensen 1950,409)
In 1777, when Congress adopted the Articles of Confederation and sent them to 
the states for ratification, they created a government that had various lawmaking and 
governing powers. They did not, however, give that authority any way to either fund or 
enforce their decisions. The body’s president, committees, and civil officers had duties
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which would qualify as executive functions.'^ They also established a court of appeals
for cases of capture in 1780. Regardless, the Confederation could hardly be considered to
possess the characteristics of a tripartite government. (Shane, Bruff 1996, 5)
Congress had created more of an alliance than a nation. The articles cannot be
said to have not dispersed power effectively, for they contained very little real power.
Congress, having no power to make rules binding citizens, was less a legislative branch
than an executive or administrative one. Under the pressures of wartime necessity,
however, that body substantially evolved. Eventually, Congress became less of an
administrator and more of a policy making body for a set of permanent subordinate
bodies. Through this necessity, they created mixed boards composed of their own
members and outsiders. These boards oversaw admiralty, war and finance but still relied
upon the states for the implementation o f their decisions. Even with this progress, men
like George Washington and John Adams pressed for further reform.
The need for a separate executive branch was becoming very clear. Alexander
Hamilton complained extensively about the:
Want of method and energy in the administration . . .  and the want o a 
proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much in their own 
hands and have meddled too much with details of every sort. Congress is, 
properly, a deliberative corps, and it forgets itself when it attempts to play 
the executive. It is impossible such a body, numerous as it is, and 
constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision or with system.
( in Frisch 1991,64)
Thomas Jefferson later expanded on this argument:
The “civil officers” were the Postmaster General after 1775, and the Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Finance (replaced by the 
Board of Treasury in 178 4) after 1781.
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I think it very Material to separate in the hands of Congress the Executive 
and Legislative powers, as the judiciary already are in some degree. . .  The 
Want of it has been the source of more evil than we have experienced from 
any other cause. Nothing so embarrassing as the details of execution. The 
smallest trifle of that kind occupies as long as the most important act of 
legislation, and takes the place of everything else.
( in Peterson 1975,170)
Finally, in 1781, the first truly executive departments were formed. These
included the department of foreign affairs, war, marine, and treasury, nevertheless, as the
war ended the states allowed Congress to wither back down to a powerless body. As they
needed nine states delegates to be present to pass any legislation, they were without a
quorum for all but fourteen days during the 1785-6 session. (Shane, Bruff 1996,6)
As early as July of 1783, Alexander Hamilton was calling the lack of a separation
of powers in the Articles of Confederation to be one of its major weaknesses. He
criticized it mainly on the grounds that it was “confounding legislative and executive
powers in a single body” and for lacking a federal judicature “having cognizance of all
matters of general concem.”(Frisch 1991, 86) Hamilton was one of the first to draft
resolutions calling for a convention to amend the Articles. He wrote that the
Confederation’s structure was “Contrary o the most approved and well founded maxims
of free government which require that the legislative executive and judicial should be
deposited in distinct and separate hands.” (Frisch 1991, 87) Hamilton had intended to
submit these resolutions to the Continental Congress; however, he abandoned the project
because o f the lack of support that it had.(Casper 1997,17)
In his book on the origins of the Constitution, Forest McDonald concludes that the
“doctrine of separation of powers had clearly been abandoned in the ft-aming of the
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Constitution.” (McDonald 1985,258) When he discusses this “doctrine”, he refers to the 
“pure doctrine” that is illuminated in the work of M. J. C. Vile.(Vile 1967,13) This 
analysis assumes that there actually was a doctrine prior to the Federal Convention that 
the framers could have abandoned. As the previous discussion of state constitutions has 
revealed, there was no sense of a definitive doctrine that could be agreed upon between 
1776 and the opening of the convention. Thus, there was no specific doctrine to abandon. 
As the convention began, there was only one thing that all of the delegates agreed upon in 
terms of separation of powers. Without it, there would be tyranny.
In early 1787, James Madison began to see the inherent problems in a system of 
separation of powers that included legislative supremacy. In his memo entitled Vices o f 
the Political System o f  the United States he focused on what he believed to be the 
fundamental problems in our system of state dominance and weak central authority. 
Included in the defects that he saw in state governments were the noncompliance with 
congressional requisitions, encroachment on national authority, violation of treaties, 
trespass on each other, and a lack of guarantees against intemal violence. (Wormuth 
1949,478) Within the memo, Madison urged that the only solution to the tyranny that 
had developed in the states was to strengthen the national government.
In his Notes on the State of Virginia Thomas Jefferson complained that: “All the 
powers of government, legislative executive and judiciary, result to the legislative body.”
It seemed to him that “ 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one.” Indeed, the 
Virginia Constitution had forbidden any branch to exercise the power of another, “but 
none was provided between these several powers.” In Virginia, the executive and
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judiciary were dependent on the legislature for subsistence, and even continuance. 
Jefferson, thus argued that power should be so divided and balanced among several 
bodies. . .  that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually 
checked and restrained by the others.”(Peterson 1975, 157) Noting the influence that Mr. 
Jefferson had on the mind and theories of James Madison, it is not surprising that once 
the convention started, Mr. Madison was advocating a similar opinion on the separation 
of powers.
As the substantive debate of the 1787 Convention began, John Randolph 
delivered an address enumerating the defects of the Confederation, ommitting any 
reference to the separation of powers.(Solberg 1990, 37) In the minds of many of the 
delegates who were in attendance on that day, the separation of powers was not amongst 
the major issues that needed to be resolved by the Convention.
It made a subtle appearance, however, in the proposal made by Virginia delegate 
James Madison. Drafted on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, Madison’s 
Virginia Plan effectively set the agenda for the assembly. Although it only implied a 
separation of powers, the Virginia plan would set a course of debate that continually 
revolved around the issue. Fundamentally, this debate set up a vague yet complex 
doctrine that would prove to be troublesome for future generations of legislators.
The Virginia Plan separated legislative and executive personnel through an 
ineligibility clause. It created a chief executive that would be elected by the legislature 
without the possibility of re-election, but failed to specify how many people would make 
up that body. It further created a council of revision that would be made up of both
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executive and judicial members. This body was to hold a qualified veto over national 
laws and an absolute veto over state laws. Overall, in Madison’s original schema, 
separation of powers was much less prominent than was the amount of power that would 
be concentrated in Congress.(Baade 1991,1003)
On May 30, the day after the Virginia Plan was first introduced, the Committee of 
the Whole overwhelmingly adopted a resolution stating “that a national government 
ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive.” 
(Solberg 1990, 38-9) This point marks both the beginning and end of formal separation 
of powers debate. It was indirectly, through the rest of the Convention, that the doctrine 
would come to life. In the subsequent discussion of the structure and powers that would 
be assigned to each of the respective branches, in the repeated debates over the council of 
revision, and in the numerous comments and discussions concerning independence, 
encroachments and the need for checks and balances the doctrine grew into one of the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution.(Casper 1997,18)
Even in Madison’s notes, the most complete record of the Convention, it is 
difficult to identify the decisive influences on a text that evolved from a series of 
compromises. The process that was employed to reach a final document was far from 
being free of error. Decisions were made by a majority vote of the states. These 
decisions were marked by intemal divisions in the delegations, close votes, and 
fluctuating outcomes.(Shane, Bruff 1996,7) Often, it was even difficult to identify what 
interests a particular state had at heart when they voted for a proposed stmctural feature 
of the new govemment.(Fisher 1981, 176)
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By 1787, both separation of powers and checks and balances were widely 
accepted as general principles throughout American government. Arguing that 
parchment rarely stops men from taking power, James Madison provided a key link 
between the two principles. He believed that checks were the only effective way to 
maintain separation. Effectively checking ambition with ambition, no one would allow 
another to take a portion of his power.
There was, however, lively disagreement over the institutional arrangements that 
could satisfy the separation of powers. The Constitution’s major attribute of formal 
separation of powers is its separation of personnel. As important as that formal 
separation may be, it is equally important that there is an independent political base 
established for the presidency. That base, combined with executive nomination and 
guarantees of tenure for the judiciary, effectively created three independent branches of 
government. By severing dependence on the legislature, the other branches became free to 
act as independent entities.
Despite this step towards more clearly separated powers, those who wanted 
neither a king nor another confederacy, believed that the executive power established in 
the Constitution remained too vaguely defined. The Convention’s most important 
limitations of executive power were the conditional nature of the veto and the senatorial 
checks on appointments and treaties. This left a great deal to be decided by time and 
precedent.( Adams 1980,285)
“Corruption” in the system was prevented by a compromise forbidding the joint 
holding of legislative and executive office. This was weakened only slightly by their
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decision to allow former legislators to be appointed to executive offices. The framers, 
armed with their new theory of executive responsibility to the people, saw no reason to 
adopt the responsibility to the legislature that England was still struggling to accomplish. 
(Bailyn 1965,112) The biggest check on the executive would now come from the 
educated and virtuous citizenry.
The judiciary received the least attention, because it was regarded as having the 
least power.(Flaherty 1996, 1725) There was agreement that the Court should be 
independent, with Justices holding tenure during good behavior. Congress was left free to 
create lower courts and to determine the size of the Supreme Court. Although there was 
no formal debate over judicial review of legislation, at least eight delegates, including 
James Madison and James Wilson, did remark that the judicial function would include 
the review of legislation. When this issue was raised, no one argued to the contrary. 
(Solberg 1990, 36-48)
As the finished Constitution was presented to the states. New York became a 
pivotal domino in its ratification. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay 
joined forces in an attempt to win public support for the document in New York. Their 
product, the Federalist Papers, had many obstacles to overcome. It seemed that for many 
of the citizens of the United States, the evil that they knew was a better option than the 
one that they had not yet encountered. One of the most formidable of these tasks was to 
justify the abandonment o f strict separation of powers in favor of a system that relied 
heavily on checks and balances.
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James Madison took on this task personally in Federalist 47-51. In Number 47 he 
states that separate branches are needed to prevent undue concentrations of power. 
However, this discussion moves on to the value of checks and balances by the third 
paragraph. His core argument in Federalist 47 is actually the “impossibility and 
inexpediency of avoiding any mixture” as demonstrated by the state constitutions and as 
supported by the “oracle who is always consulted and cited on the subject. . .  the 
celebrated Montesquieu.” Montesquieu according to Madison, did not mean to suggest 
that the three departments “ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the 
acts of each other.’’(Rossiter 1961, 301) Instead, he emphasized the importance of 
determining the levels and areas in which independence, cooperation and competition 
should be employed.
In Federalist 48, he explains that “parchment Barriers” such as those that had 
been erected by the states in their constitutions could not ensure that separation would be 
put into practice. Only constitutional controls explicitly placed in each of the branches 
that could be held over the other branches could assure separation. Further, each branch 
needed to have adequate defenses against the others so that none could enjoy the right of 
superiority by setting the boundaries. He concludes that multiple representation plus 
separation of powers and checks and balances would prevent corruption of the overall 
balance of government. It would achieve this by preventing any officer from acquiring 
power over officers in the other branches.
In Federalist 49, Madison begins by according credit to the ideas of his friend 
Thomas Jefferson. The purpose of Number 49 seems to be quite philosophical in nature.
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He sets the people as the ultimate overseer of the separation of powers within 
government. He then goes on to question the reason and reliance on passion of those 
same people. Finally, he uses the controversy that he has created to put forth the idea that 
dominance by the popular assembly would be a grave error. Overall, his argument here is 
against the legislative supremacy that had dominated the state constitutions and for a 
government balanced by intemal checks.(Rossiter 1961,314-17)
At the core of the argument made in Federalist 50 is the question of whether or 
not the Constitution should be periodically reviewed by the people either directly or 
through a board of censors. However, the arguments involved have a great bearing on a 
crucial part of Mr. Madison’s scheme of separation of powers. Within his defense of the 
Constitution’s amendment procedures is the argument that intemal checks are the only 
ones that will keep a government from becoming tyrannical. If an external body were 
formed to oversee the balancing of government, they would be prone to corruption and 
the influence of factions. Being the chief enemy of Madisonian Republicanism, he 
surmises that the presence o f such factions would surely destroy the institutional balance 
within the govemment.(Rossiter 1961,318-19)
This argument is continued in Federalist 5 1. Here, he extends the argument that 
external checks would not effectively balance the branches of government by explaining 
why intemal checks would. He explains that the ability of ambition to check ambition 
within the branches would remedy “the defect of better motives” and allow private 
interest to “be sentinel over the public rights”(Rossiter 1961, 324), thereby, creating a
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system that could not fail unless the basic human quality of wanting power should 
disappear.
The courts provided the Federalists with a possible stabilizer to keep the other two 
branches in balance. The prospect of judicial review, however, forced the spectre of 
judicial supremacy to raise its head. In his Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton tried to 
relieve those fears. Here he argues that the courts would provide healthy checks on 
Congress. He notes that the interpretation of statutes could serve as one check. 
Furthermore, outright invalidation of legislation was justified by the supremacy of the 
Constitution. If the Constitution had faults, the proper amendment process could be 
invoked which would bypass the Court all together. Indeed, the absence of a Court would 
violate the “celebrated maxim” of separation of powers, because lawmakers would be left 
to judge their own cause.(Rossiter 1961,468) He further argues in Federalist 81 that 
impeachment threats would be sufficient to prevent Justices from abusing their 
power.(Rossiter 1961,482)
The Federalist Papers were met head on with zealous opposition. The Anti- 
Federalists feared that a president could become king for life because of their long (4 
year) term, re-election eligibility, absence of a council, powers as commander-in-chief 
and appointment powers. They believed that the Senate could become “a fixed and 
unchanging body” that was allied to the President through shared powers over legislation, 
treaties, and appointments. If these evils befell our government, we would be forced into 
a worse situation than already existed under the Articles of Confederation.(Storing 1981, 
37)
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These fears led to a close battle for the ratification of the new Constitution. Even 
after the new nation was technically formed by nine of the thirteen states signing the 
Constitution into law, it was still not viable. In order to have a chance at success, the 
Federalists needed New York and Virginia to join their cause. If they had refused to sign, 
the country would have been fundamentally divided into three sections with powerful 
enemies between their fragmented borders. Luckily, Virginia joined after a promise was 
made to add a bill of rights to the Constitution during the first session of Congress. New 
York, which had long been leaning towards the side of the anti-federalists, was weakened 
by the intense efforts of Alexander Hamilton in its ratifying convention. Finally, it too 
ratified the Constitution, although by a slim margin.(Shane, Bruff 1996, 10)
The issue of separation of powers was not to lie dormant for long. In 1789, James 
Madison proposed a constitutional amendment to incorporate the separation of powers 
into the Constitution as a formal doctrine. The amendment, which would have been 
included as Article Vm, read: “The powers delegated by this constitution, are 
appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the 
legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; 
nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial 
exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.”(Veit 1991, 96) 
This amendment, ingeniously included the concept of checks and balances without 
explicitly stating that it did. The separation of powers provision in Roger Sherman’s 
draft bill of rights, also dating from the summer of 1789, captured even more clearly the 
point made by Madison’s proposal: “The legislative, executive and judiciary powers
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vested by the Constitution in the respective branches of he Government of the United 
States shall be exercised according to the distribution therein made, so that neither of said 
branches shall assume or exercise any of the powers peculiar to either of the other 
branches.”(Veit 1991, 104)
The House adopted Madison’s proposal despite objections that it was unnecessary 
and “subversive to the Constitution”.(Veit 1991,105) Madison believed that “the people 
would be gratified with the amendment, as it was admitted that the powers ought to be 
separate and distinct; it might also tend to an explanation of some doubts that might arise 
respecting the construction of the Constitution.”(Veit 1991, 103) It was quite an 
interesting suggestion that the Congress should adopt a measure that would make a vague 
concept easier to interpret. Nevertheless, the Senate rejected the amendment. Gerhard 
Casper believes that the Senate was not eager to adopt separation of powers as an 
independent doctrine because of the subtle “mixing” decisions that had been made by the 
framers, many of which benefited the Senate.
From this point forward, the Supreme Court was left with little to guide them on 
matters of separation of powers. The doctrine was ambiguous enough to allow a great 
deal of leeway, yet important enough that little leeway should be allowed. Since that time 
the Court has developed six different ways to interpret the doctrine. Those methods often 
stand at odds with each other and result in varying decisions. At other times, they are 
used in conjunction with each other in the same decision. In order to understand the 
different perspectives and the way that those perspectives have affected the institution of
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government in this nation, it is only appropriate to look at the cases that have established 
a doctrine of separation of powers for the year 2000 A. D. and beyond.
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CHAPTER III 
THE TEXTUAL APPROACH TO THE DOCTRINE
Since our nation is founded on a written constitution, it is only natural for the 
Coiut to at least lay some stress upon the meaning of the text. The question becomes how 
much emphasis and in what fashion that emphasis should be applied. The interpretive 
strategies that are often thought appropriate for the constitutional guarantees of due 
process and equal protection are often referred to as “open-textured”. (Shane, Bruff 1996, 
11) This means that it is generally agreed that the text was intentionally left vague, to be 
more explicitly defined by precedent.
The question then becomes whether or not these same strategies should be 
employed in separation of powers issues. If the text seems clear, then it must be 
questioned how much other interpretive techniques should be employed. If the text 
seems ambiguous, the justices must decide if it should confine their decision at all. In the 
end. Justices make this determination for themselves.
Texually speaking, the Separation of Powers Doctrine is not easily identified. Its 
premises are spread throughout the document and can be easily separated from the whole. 
Thus, one must examine not only if a Justice is adhering to the text, but if he/she is 
adhering to the entire text. This can help the examiner to determine which school of
60
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textualism the Justice belongs to. If the Justice sees the Separation of Powers Doctrine as 
a number disjointed ideals, then his approach to the text will be “clause bound”. If they 
see the Doctrine as a coherent whole, then their approach will be from the “structural” 
school. On the other hand, there are those who adhere to “purposive” textualism, and see 
the doctrine as part of a group of larger Constitution goals.(Murphy, Fleming and 
Barber 1995, 386)
Although it may seem unconvincing to argue that the “clause bound” approach to 
the Doctrine has been widely used, and it may well be that no Supreme Court Justice has 
consistently adhered to the approach; Professor Charles L. Black argues to the contrary. 
He claims that, “in dealing with the questions o f constitutional law, we have preferred the 
method of piuported explication or exegesis of the textual passage considered as a 
directive of action, as opposed to the method of inference from the structures and 
relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal part.” (Black 
1969, 7) If this analysis is true, it may lend some understanding to why interpretation of 
the separation o f powers has been so muddled.
As Judge Learned Hand noted that “a melody is more than the notes” textual 
“structuralists” see the “clause bound” interpreters as failing to see the big picture that the 
Constitution renders. Nevertheless, they may themselves be caught in a “hermeneutic 
circle” in that it is impossible to understand the parts without understanding the whole, 
but it is also impossible to understand the whole without imderstanding the parts. 
(Murphy, Fleming and Barber 1995,387) Thereby, both schools are faced with the
See Helvering v. Gregory (U.S.C.A., 2d Cir. 1934)
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problems of fit, conflict, and reconciliation that a complex doctrine like the separation of 
powers presents.
Though it may be complementary to either, “purposive” textualism differs from 
both the “clause bound” and “structural” approaches. This approach was best described 
by James Madison in his Federalist 40 when he writes that:
There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as 
well as founded on legal axioms. The one is that every part of the 
expression ought, if possible, be made to conspire to some common end.
The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the 
less important should give way to the more important part; the means 
should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means.
(Rossiter 1961,89)
Those who adhere to this approach would argue that as long as the goals of accountability 
and balance were achieved, it would make no difference whether those actions were 
explained by a single clause or the entire document.
Beyond looking at which school of textualism an interpreter is reading from, it is 
also necessary to examine whether she is confining the Constitution to the words written 
within its articles. If not, the Justice may be including the preamble and amendments, or 
perhaps a number of other documents in their textual interpretation. It is seldom agreed 
upon that the Constitution only includes the document proper. Thereby, many 
interpreters also choose to include things like Madison’s notes from the Constitutional 
Convention, the Federalist Papers, the works of men like Blackstone and Locke who 
influenced the Framers, and even transcripts from the ratification debates of the various 
states. The inclusion and/or exclusion of these various documents further complicates 
our reading of the intent of the American doctrine of separation of powers.
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Beyond all of this confusion, looms the ominous fact that once a Justice has 
decided which school of textualism that they belong to, and once they have decided 
exactly what they are going to include in their interpretive processes, they still must 
define the words that they are basing their decision upon. This interpretive problem is 
hardly a recent one. James Madison identified the problem in Federalist 37 as he 
contemplates that: “When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their 
own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the 
cloudy medium through which it is communicated.” (Rossiter 1961, 86) Words often fail 
to clearly communicate thoughts. Moreover, in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, 
“Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all 
situations, one single definite idea; and nothing is more common that to use words in a 
figurative sense.” In considering these two viewpoints, one must be led to believe that 
the Framers of the Constitution, even through all of their debates, did not leave the 
constitutional convention with an agreed upon definition of exactly what the Separation 
of Powers Doctrine entailed. If this is accepted, it must then be pondered whether anyone 
can read the text and truly decipher its writer’s intended meaning.
This is not to argue from a “deconstructionalist” viewpoint that the text has no 
meaning. (Murphy, Fleming and Barber 1995, 115) Rather, it should help to shed light 
on the fact that although interpretations of the Separation of Powers Doctrine have 
resulted in decidedly different and often conflicting viewpoints, the decisions were all 
thought to be firmly founded upon the text itself. This begins our inquisition into how 
these conflicting decisions have come about and how to use the Doctrine in the future.
” McCulloch V. Maryland 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)
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As all constitutional interpretation inevitably begins with the text, it is only 
appropriate to start by looking at the beginning of the conflict over separation of powers. 
Despite going down in history as the case that established judicial review, the case o f 
Marbury v. Madison‘S was also the first time that the Supreme Court was asked to resolve 
a significant conflict between Congress and the President. Moreover, this decision set the 
stage for textualism to be the basis for separation o f powers decisions for the next 
hundred years. (Carter 1985, 821)
The case itself, ultimately decided that although Mr. Marbury may be entitled to 
the commission of Justice of the Peace, the Court could not issue a Writ of Mandamus 
forcing the Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commission. Moreover, they 
could not force him to deliver the commission because the statute which empowered 
them to hear Mr. Marbury’s case was unconstitutional. The opinion, which was written 
by Chief Justice John Marshall, has become a pillar of constitutional law.
Essentially, Marshall’s argument that the act was unconstitutional came down to a 
“clause bound” textual interpretation of Article III of the Constitution. He believed that 
the language of Article III restricts the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
certain limited types of cases. Specifically, those “affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State may be a Party.” Thereby, as section 
13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 attempted to expand the Court’s original jurisdiction 
beyond the limitation provided in Article HI, it was “repugnant” to the Constitution.
A more “structural” reading of Article HI does not discover any such explicit 
statement providing that the Court’s original jurisdiction cannot be expanded to absorb
"5U .S .(1  Cranch) 137(1803)
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some cases that might otherwise fail only within its appellate jurisdiction. Instead, it only
explicitly states that there are certain cases that must be treated within their original
jurisdiction, and that Congress has no right to make laws that would remove them from
that jurisdiction.(Van Alstyne 1987,605)
Marshall acknowledges this point and attempts to answer it within his opinion in
the following fashion:
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to 
apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts 
according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to 
have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the 
tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section 
is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the 
construction. If Congress remains at liberty to give the court appellate 
jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be 
original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it 
shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, 
is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other 
objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense 
must be given to them, or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is 
intended to be without effect; and therefore, such a construction is 
inadmissible, unless the words require it.
Here, Marshall’s essential point is that any interpretation other than the one he uses would
leave the text without any significance and would thereby, serve no useful purpose.”
From a more “structural” viewpoint. Article HI, section 2, clause 2, readily
supports the interpretation that the Court’s original jurisdiction may not be reduced by
Congress, but that it may be supplemented. This supplementation would naturally come
”  Article Ill’s division of jurisdiction may serve another useful purpose. Had Congress 
not adopted the Judiciary Act of 1789, or taken another action describing the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction, the original division would have provided the Court with a guideline 
to follow until Congress could or did take action.
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by adding to the original jurisdiction, cases that would normally fall within their appellate 
jurisdiction. (Van Alstyne 1987,606) This reading makes sense and in no way makes any 
part of the clause “surplusage”. Thus, it might be supposed that certain kinds of cases 
like “those affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a Party” (Article III, 2,2) could have been regarded by the Framers 
as being of such importance that they should at all times enjoy original access to the 
Supreme Court. Cases affecting Ambassadors might have been felt to involve too 
sensitive of issues involving relations with foreign countries to have been heard by any 
other authority. Likewise, cases in which a state is a party may have been believed to 
involve too sensitive of issues involving federalism and interstate relations. It could, 
thereby, be argued that these cases merely constituted an “irreducible minimum” of 
Supreme Court original jurisdiction. (Corwin 1950,56)
The very next sentence after the establishment of original jurisdiction provides 
that “in all the other cases before mentioned (including cases arising under ‘the Laws of 
the United States' such as Marbury's case), the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact;” however the comma is followed immediately by 
by a distinct qualification. That qualification reads: “with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” It is thus reasonable to read the entire 
clause as saying that the Congress may exclude certain cases that would otherwise be part 
of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction by adding them to their original jurisdiction. (Van 
Alstyne 1987, 607) That is exactly what Congress attempted to do with section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. Moreover, contrary to Chief Justice Marshall’s reading, this 
interpretation would leave nothing to “mere surplusage”.
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If Chief Justice Marshall had chosen to take the “purposive” approach to the text, 
he once again may have come to a different conclusion than the one that he did. Through 
this approach, it would have to be noted that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was adopted by 
the first Congress organized under the new Constitution, just two years after the 
Constitution was proposed and in the same year that it took effect. Many of the same 
men who participated in the Constitutional Convention also participated in the enactment 
of the Judiciary Act. The “purposive” approach would beg the Court to believe that the 
first Congress was in tune with the purpose and goals of separation of powers that Article 
III, section 2 was trying to achieve. Furthermore, Marshall himself would use this 
approach to uphold a federal statute in McCulloch v. Maryland^^. Here, he noted that: 
“The power now contested was exercised by the first Congress elected under the present 
constitution.. . .  It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that a measure 
adopted under these circumstances was a bold and plain usurpation, to which the 
constitution gave no countenance.” Through this opinion, one of two things becomes 
clear: that Chief Justice Marshall was inconsistent in his use of textualism, or that he 
views the issues of separation of powers and those regarding federalism in very different 
lights.
One o f the more significant criticisms of Marshall’s opinion is that it fails to 
establish that independent judicial review, rather than relying on Congress to police 
themselves on the constitutionality of their laws, is more consistent with the text and 
structure of the Constitution. Still, no one has formulated a stronger textual argument for
20 17U.S.(4 Wheat.)316(1819).
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the proposition that Congress’ interpretation should be final, or for any other alternative. 
(Tribe 1988,25)
The Case of Marbury v. Madison is paramount to the current American Doctrine 
of Separation of Powers; however, it did little to resolve the matter of how the doctrine 
should be interpreted. As a matter of fact, none of the cases arising under the separation 
of powers for the next hundred years would use “clause bound” texualism as their 
primary method of interpretation."' The failure in this case to firmly establish what, 
textually speaking, separation of powers entailed, left the door open for various other 
interpretive techniques to forge their own strongholds on the doctrine. As will be argued 
later, this has left our government today with little predictability regarding how the Court 
will view a given separation of powers issue. As Justice Stone iterated in his now famous 
dissent in the A.A.A. Case: “While unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive 
and legislative branches is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our (the 
Supreme Court) exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint.” (Corwin 1950, vii) 
As the following case will show, that restraint wears decidedly different faces when 
judicial modes of interpretation change.
Hugo Black is often referred to as the greatest of the textualists. (Murphy, 
Fleming and Barber 1995, 113) He lived up to this title as he wrote the opinion in the 
case of Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer^'. The case itself revolved around 
Executive Order 10340, but the decision is instrumental in understanding how many 
different interpretations can be employed in one case.
For a list of these cases, see note 28 
^  343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863,96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952)
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In 1952, during the Korean Conflict, President Truman directed the Secretary of 
Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate the steel mills that had been under the 
control of the United Steel Workers. This order was given because of the eminent 
possibility that the steel workers would go on strike and the country’s steel production, 
which was vital to the war effort, would be halted.
The constitutional question that evolved was whether or not the President had the 
power to seize the mills in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
(The Taft-Hartley Act). In a 6-3 decision, the Court decided that indeed. President 
Truman had violated the separation of powers by seizing the mills. An analysis of the 
majority opinion will show the mixed nature of the decision and the awkward precedent 
that it established.
Justice Black, who wrote the opinion for the Court, delivered a decidedly “clause 
bound” interpretation of the text. His relatively short opinion is based upon two clauses 
from the Constitution. First, he stands firm on Article II, section 1, clause 1, which states 
that “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." 
From this he notes that “The constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall 
make the laws which the President is to execute.” He further qualifies this when he states 
that: “There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of 
property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been 
directed from which such a power can fairly be implied.” By strictly following this clause 
and his definition of the words that it contains. Justice Black is able to reduce the problem 
to a much simpler one; did the President act in a legislative capacity in violation of the 
Constitution?
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Secondly, he invokes Article II, section 3 of the Constitution which states that the 
President should “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”. From this, he notes that: 
“When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an 
amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of 
emergency. . . ” From this he easily deduces that the President clearly acted in violation 
of his assigned function within the separation of powers.
Although five of the Justices sided with Black, an analysis of their concurring 
opinions shows how disjointed the decision actually was. Two of the Justices, Black and 
Douglas, found no power in the President to seize manufacturing sites in time of 
emergency unless the seizure was expressly authorized by Congress. Three of them, 
including Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton found power in the President to take 
such action unless the power was expressly prohibited or disaffirmed by Congress. The 
final Justice, Justice Clark, affirmed the power of the President to deal with emergencies 
but found it to be negatived because Congress had strictly prescribed procedure that 
specifically excluded the President’s actions. (Kauper 1952,157)
To put the matter into perspective, the first two Justices based their opinion on a 
“clause bound” interpretation of the Constitution. The following three Justices tried to 
resolve the matter by looking by taking a ‘purposive” approach to the document and 
deciding that its intention was to allow the President a great deal of freedom where 
Congress had not established other prescriptions. The final Justice sees the situation in a 
“structural” capacity. His view is that the structure of the Constitution allows the 
President a great deal of latitude in pressing matters. Moreover, he believes that the 
President’s freedom in such situations can only be suppressed by acts of Congress.
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Before leaving this case, it is also important make note of Mr. Justice Jackson’s 
unique opinion. Although he concurs with the decision, he poignantly disapproves of 
Justice Black’s “clause bound’ interpretation. In doing so. He writes that: “The actual art 
of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions 
of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles tom 
from context.” He further argues that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches 
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not 
fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress.” Within this clear contradiction to the “opinion of the Court” Justice Jackson 
was still able to concur with the decision. It is mixed interpretations like these that have 
led to confusion on the actual meaning of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
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FORMALISM: IN SEARCH OF ORIGINAL INTENT
Alexander Hamilton, in the guise of Publius, wrote that the judiciary was “the 
least dangerous” branch of the govemment.^(Rossiter 1961,465) James Madison, under 
the same pen-name told his readers of the most dangerous: “The legislative department” 
he wrote, “is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into 
its impetuous vortex.”^^*(Rossiter 1961, 309) With these boundaries set, and the 
executive lying somewhere in between, the Framers of our Constitution set forth to 
establish a government the likes of which the world had never seen. In that Constitution, 
the Framers tried to set up the Amctional duties and boundaries that each of the respective 
branches would enjoy; however, they only did so for the pinnacles of each of those 
branches. Moreover, they became less specific in their definition as they moved down the 
ladder o f “dangerousness” from the legislature to the judiciary.
According to the Constitution, judicial power is to “extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made. . .  under their A u th o r i ty .T h is  statement of jurisdiction is relatively all, within
^  The Federalist No. 78 
The Federalist No. 48 
U. S. Const. Art. m  § 2
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the Constitution, that defines the functions of that branch. The question that arises is 
whether the lack of definition of duty in Article III of the Constitution was intentional, or 
whether it is merely indicative of the role that the Framers thought that the judiciary 
would hold.
In the quest to determine whether the separation of powers doctrine in the United 
States today is still the one that our forefathers had envisioned, we must look at their 
intentions in regard to the role of the various branches of the government that they 
established. It may be that the Framers of the Constitution were purposefully non­
specific about the role and duties of the “third branch” ®̂ because they were unsure of the 
whole function that they would have to serve in order establish and regulate the new 
government. More importantly, the poor definition that those Framers gave for separation 
of powers has left today’s Supreme Court Justices to guess what was actually intended by 
the doctrine.
To begin to study the question of “original intent” ’̂ with regard to the judiciary in 
the United States, one must step back into the history and experience of those who 
founded this nation. The scholarship on this subject focuses in particular on the ideas of 
“separation of powers” and “checks and balances”. These ideas more than any others 
guided the Framers toward a fiamework that they believed would establish balance
Donald S. Lutz puts forth the idea that the judiciary being listed last in the tripartite 
separation of powers was intentional and showed that the judiciary served a subservient 
role, (see Lutz 1988,158)
ORIGINAL INTENT here is used to mean what was expected in a historical sense at 
the time of the fiaming of the Constitution from the Judicial Branch, not to be confused 
with the method of Constitutional interpretation employed by Justices Scalia, Thomas and 
Rehnquist
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among the branches, responsibility or accountability to the electorate and energetic, 
efficient govemment.(Flaherty 1996,1730) Of these, they looked at ‘balance’ as being 
the most crucial.^*
Despite this emphasis, an analysis of our nation’s history reveals relatively little 
controversy over the issue of separation of powers.(Flaherty 1996, 1732) Prior to 1926, 
the Supreme Court had only considered seven separation of powers cases which directly 
involved Congress and the President.*’ The importance of this lies in the lack of conflict 
that needed an arbitrator for resolution. In contrast to the federal government and the 
states, the President and the Congress seem to have been able to work out methods to 
keep the government efficiently functioning without the need for the Supreme Court to 
referee their disputes.
This apparent harmony has diminished since the Myers v. United States^° 
decision, which promoted a unitary presidency. That case, which must have given 
comfort to the ghost of impeached president Andrew Johnson, forbade Congress from 
passing legislation that extended their power of advise and consent in regards to 
presidential appointments and his power o f removal. Although the case revolved around
These three general objectives are put forth by Wood, McDonald, and Rakove in the 
works which have been cited as the most fundamental goals of the new Constitution. 
Further, they employ the idea that since ‘balance’ was cited more often during the 
Convention that it was first in the Framers minds.
These cases are as follows: Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897); United 
States V. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483(1886); Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 
50(1884); United States ex. Rel Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854); In re 
Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This list 
compiled from Flaherty, pp 1733-5.
272 U.S. 52 (1926)
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a minor position, that of postmaster, it established a precedent based on formalism in 
regard to the removal power. More explicitly. Chief Justice Taft believed that no branch 
should have implied powers to participate in the ftmctions assigned by the Constitution to 
another; because removal is an executive ftmction, the Senate may not share it.
Therefore, the President has an unlimited power to remove those executive officers that 
he has appointed. (Shane, Bruff 1996,417)
The case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States^' nine years later, refuted that 
idea. This case, which decided whether or not President Roosevelt could remove a 
member of the Federal Trade Commission for decidedly political reasons, allowed the 
Congress to limit the President’s removal powers. In doing so, the Court effectively 
established a fourth branch of government. This fourth branch, performing “quasi­
judicial and quasi-legislative functions distinguishes them from the activities performed 
by purely executive officers.” (Shane, Bruff 1996,423) In a total reversal of the 
formalistic interpretation in Meyers the Court seemed determined to avoid the formalistic 
idea of original intent. They did not, however, overturn the Meyers decision to dispel the 
ambiguity that they had created. Instead, they justified their decision on the basis that the 
two positions in question were decidedly different in their nature.
Inconsistent decisions like these have accelerated during recent years. As recently 
as 1995, in the decision in Plaut v. Spendthrift farm, Inc.^' the point was once again 
confirmed that the Supreme Court is undecided about where to draw the line o f separation 
o f powers between the Congress and the President. (Shane, Bruff 1996, 90) This has
295 U.S. 602(1935) 
114 S. Ct. 1447(1995)
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made it much more difficult for the two branches to work towards common goals.
Previously, agreements between these two branches had been the norm since the 
implementation of the Constitution.(Corwin 1950, 6) However, as more and more 
controversies have arisen over such agreements, the issue of the Framer’s intent with 
respect to separation of powers has become paramount. Thus, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of that intent has allowed them to wield a great deal of power. This, in 
effect, has tumed the table in the debate over the ‘least dangerous branch’. More 
importantly, the power to interpret that intent without anyone to check their power, has 
had awesome implications for our government. In light of the disagreement over the 
meaning of separation of powers and the drastically different explications that are 
currently being employed by the bench, the President and Congress are left in limbo with 
regard to the doctrine.
In nearly all of the cases that have arisen in the last two decades, the Court has 
employed one of two basic approaches to the Constitution in justifying their confounding 
decisions. The first, which supports the idea of a unitary executive, is generally referred 
to as the formalistic approach. This perspective on the Constitution was originally put 
forth by Chief Justice Taft in the Meyers decision. Today, its best known followers have 
been Chief Justice Burger, along with current Justices Scalia and Thomas.(Smith 1995, 
49). This approach, is easily the Court’s most dominant. However, its own success has 
forced controversial aspects of the approach to come to light. This, in turn, has led to a 
Court which has seen the opportunity to usurp more power for itself over the other two 
branches by forcing them to rely upon judicial approval to effectively institute public 
policy.
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It is fairly obvious why formalism is highly regarded by many judges. Its roots lie 
in what “every school child leams”.(Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991)) 
about separation of powers. This learning proposes that there are three discrete branches 
of government, each exercising one of three distinct powers. Within it, the legislative, 
executive, and judicial each controlling their own sphere of government without 
hindrance or infringement by either of the other two branches. Within this schema, it is 
supposed that the powers which mark the respective domains of each branch are readily 
definable and easily identified. The domain of the executive is especially broad under 
this approach, amounting nearly by default to any governmental action outside of passing 
a law or adjudicating a case.(Flaherty 1996, 1828) The need to contain this executive 
power and limit it to a manageable sphere lies at the heart of the arrangements made 
between Congress and the President. The Supreme Court is now trying to nullify many of 
these arrangements through their use of formalist principles. This has led to nothing less 
than judicial activism by the Supreme Court through the overturning of long held and 
carefully contrived methods which Congress and the executive had worked out for the 
functional maintenance of government.
Much of the judicial activism in this area has sprung from two major decisions 
handed down by the Burger Court.(Flaherty 1996,1735) The first of these decisions 
came from the landmark Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha case (462 
U.S. 919(1983)) The opinion in this case was written by the Chief Justice himself. As an 
admitted formalist. Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion which set the tone for the strict 
formalism that is being employed today as precedent.
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The case itself dealt with a fairly simple immigration issue. Jagdish Chadha was 
bom in Kenya to Indian parents holding British passports. He came to the United States 
for the purpose o f study, in the late 1960’s. When his student visa expired, neither Kenya 
nor Great Britain would let him return. Chadha then applied for permanent residency in 
the United States. After a lengthy application process, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) approved his application. Two years later, the U.S. House 
of Representatives voted to “veto” the INS decision. Thus, Chadha faced deportation 
proceedings.
In this instance, the Congress attempted to utilize a “legislative veto”(462 U.S.
919 @ 956). This concept had been employed since the early 1930’s when Congress 
invented it to retain some control over the power delegated to the President in the 
reorganization of the executive branch agencies. By the mid 1970’s, in the aftermath of 
the Watergate scandal and the Viemam War, the use of the legislative veto to control 
excesses by the President became an attractive option.
At the same time, regulations began to pour out of these executive agencies like 
flood waters over a breaking dam. These regulations were part of the implementation 
process for all of the environmental, consumer, and other social legislation that had been 
passed over the preceding decade. As Congress saw it, Washington bureaucracies were 
trying to expand their power through these regulations. Moreover, they saw the use of the 
legislative veto as their only recourse to contain their activity. With the legislative veto. 
Congressmen were able to respond to the complaints of powerful businesses and 
industrial interests. Public interest, however, was on the side of the regulations. In fear 
that they would lose ground if the legislative veto were to be allowed to continue.
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consumer advocate Ralph Nader appointed his chief litigator, Alan Morrison to Chadha’s 
case.
This case moved from the realm of being important to one man, to a level of 
importance for all businesses and consumers, then finally to the point of being crucial to 
our entire governmental system. The pinnacle was reached when Department of Justice 
attorneys from both the Carter and Reagan administrations joined the case to support the 
decisions of the INS. By joining Morrison and his attempt to strike down legislative veto 
powers they put Congress in the ‘hot seat’. To counter. Congress intervened to defend 
the constitutionality of the process that had been in practice for over forty years. Thereby, 
this small case had tumed into a clash of the titans: the President and the Congress.
In the opinion. Chief Justice Burger made his formalist point by stating that the 
Constitution provides “a single finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure” 
(462 U.S. 919 @ 951) for the legislature to follow. He goes on to note that the “Explicit 
and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective 
functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process.”(462 U.S. 919 
@ 945) All actions by the Legislature must follow the legislative process established in 
the Constitution and “contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in 
character and effect.”(462 U.S. 919 @ 952) This “legislative character and effect” 
includes actions which have the “purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and 
relations of persons outside the legislative branch”. (462 U.S. 919 @ 952) Most 
importantly, he notes that legislative vetoes represent an attempt by the Congress to 
subvert the “step-by-step deliberate and deliberative process.” (462 U.S. 919 @ 959) and 
are thereby, unconstitutional.
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Concurring opinions in this case also emphasized that Chadha's constitutional 
rights had been violated in a similar analysis. They concurred that the Constitution had 
been violated, but on narrower grounds. In this analysis, the immigration authority could 
not be overruled without sending the matter before both houses of Congress and proper 
presentment to the President. Thereby, justification for both of these opinions lie in the 
formalist explication of the Constitution.
In one stroke of the pen, the Court had overturned more congressional enactments, 
than it had in its entire history prior to CAad/zn. (Barbara Craig in Hall 1992,422) It had 
taken the practice of allowing Congress and the Executive to work out as many of their 
differences as possible on their own, and forced them to meet a strict formalist doctrine. 
Through this formalist interpretation the judiciary has increased its power over the other 
branches of government and perhaps moved itself into the position of no longer being 
deemed the “least dangerous branch.”
This opinion and approach to separation of powers was reinforced and drawn 
upon in another Burger Court decision three years later. In Bowsher v. Synar^^, the 
Supreme Court struck down a key provision of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. This statute provided that there 
would be progressive cuts in the federal budget deficit as directed by Congress. The point 
of contention came in respect to the solution that the act employed when Congress could 
not reach an agreement. In such an instance, the Comptroller General would be 
authorized to specify which cuts would be made. It was at this point that the defined 
spheres of authority within the formalist perspective became offended. The Comptroller
33 (478 U.S. 714 (1986))
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General was regarded as a legislative position in that the person who held the office could 
only be removed through a joint resolution of both houses of Congress.(Thomas 0. 
Sargentich in Hall 1992, 80) In the formalist perspective, it was agreed that the 
specification of budget cuts was an executive branch function. In light of that, the act 
called for a legislative officer to perform executive duties, thereby, violating the 
separation of powers. (Haltom 1989, 135) More specifically, as the Comptroller was 
given a power that “plainly entailed execution of the law in constitutional terms”, (478 
U.S. 714 @ 732) rather than the formation of law she had stepped out of her 
constitutional sphere.
These cases have provided the Court with a framework of separation of powers 
that has endured, and probably will continue to do so. Its influence was seen in the 1991 
case of Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens fo r  the Abatement o f  
Airport Noisê "*, which demonstrated both the perspective’s current strength and its 
internal weaknesses. The case considered the constitutionality of a review board that was 
to be composed of nine members of Congress that would have ‘veto’ power over major 
decisions made by a joint authority established by Virginia and the District of Columbia 
to act as administrators for National and Dulles Airports. These airports had previously 
been run by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA); however, control had been handed 
over to the regional authorities in 1989.(Calebresi, Prakash 1994, 628)
In this decision, the Court found that formalist separation of powers had been 
infringed upon twice over. If the Court held that the joint airports authority exercised 
legislative powers, then the review board violated the precedent set in Chadha. In this
34 (501 U.S. 252)
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capacity, the nine members of Congress that sat on the board, made law without adhering 
to the rules of bicameralism or presentment. Moreover, they did so without even gaining 
the assent of one house of Congress. On the other hand, if the authority held executive 
power, then the review board violated Bowsher. (501 U.S. 252 @ 275-276) Within this 
view, the law was not only being ‘executed’ by congressional authorities, the authorities 
themselves were members of Congress. In the formalist viewpoint, there was no way for 
Congress to win.
Justice White’s dissent allows a glimpse into the weaker parts of this argument.
He is quick to note that “The majority never makes up its mind whether its claim is that 
the Board exercises legislative or executive authority.” (501 U.S. 252 @ 290) As 
previously noted, this is exactly the determination that formalism believes will be so easy 
and will always be so clear. At the center of the formalist belief is the idea that the three 
disparate branches exercise three distinct powers, in three absolutely divided spheres. If 
this were true, then the same power could not violate both the sphere of the Executive and 
of Congress at once. The Court’s lack of definition on this point may simply be 
indecision; however, it is more likely the case that the tasks of agencies like the FAA 
simply do not fall into any of the three rigidly defined formalist categories.(Flaherty 1996, 
1736)
It has been proposed that bureaucracies like the FAA and the INS have taken on 
characteristics that would place them in a fourth branch of govemment.(Tarr 1994, 73) 
Regardless, ignoring the special place that these agencies have grown to occupy in our 
governmental system seems to be a grave error on the part o f the Supreme Court. In the 
search for the originally intended role that the judiciary should play, the Court has fallen
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prey to an oversimplified idea that the Framers knew exactly what they meant and were 
able, unlike the rest of us, to put it down on paper leaving no need for interpretation.
Thus, it is only appropriate to inquire whether the Framers ‘intended’ formalism 
the way that Justice Scalia and his followers presume. As an executive branch lawyer. 
Justice Scalia helped to formulate the Unitarian strategy for the Chadha case.(Flaherty 
1996,1742)^^ Since becoming a Justice, he has become the Court’s strictest follower of 
the formalist doctrine. As the only dissenting justice in Mistretta v. United States^^ he 
refused to budge on the idea that judges could work together with legislators, even on the 
ideas of sentencing reform. As a scholar. Justice Scalia has sung the praises of 
presidential and legislative accountability, and he has done so in the name of the 
Framers.(Smith 1995, 51)
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the justice’s unwavering devotion to this dogma 
was his lone dissent in Morrison v. Olson?^ In this case the issue of whether statutory 
limitations could be placed on the removal o f executive officials was examined. The 
Court found that they could -  at least in the case of independent counsel. Justice Scalia, 
however, kept full faith that the Constitution assigns three clearly defined powers to three 
distinct branches. He thereby chastised the majority’s opinion for “avoiding the 
inevitable conclusion that since the statute vests some purely executive power in a person 
who is not the President of the United States, it is void.” (487 U.S. 654 @ 705) In 
striking contrast to his individual rights jurisprudence which is strictly textual. Justice
See also Barbara H. Craig, Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle, 
1988.
488 U.S. 361 (1989)
487 U.S. 654(1988)
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Scalia bases his separation of powers beliefs on inferred ideas from the tripartite 
structure of the Constitution and the Vesting Clauses^* of Articles I, II, and III. He then 
supplements this inference with history, particularly through the use of bits and pieces of 
the Federalist Papers. In addition, he continually relies upon Article XXX of the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution.^’ This contains an express separation of powers provision 
that fully supports modem formalism; however, its impact seems to be lost in its 
conspicuous absence from the Federal Constitution.(Adams 1980, 76)
Two noted political scientists have endeavored to advance this line of 
thought on a historic basis. Their works argue that the Founders clearly intended that the 
President alone, as a unitary actor, would be accountable for the execution of federal 
law.fPrakash 1993,992-4) They base their opinion on two points. First the drafting of 
various clauses of the Constitution. These include, the Vesting Clause'*®, the Take Care 
Clause'*’, the Opinions Clause'*  ̂and the Necessary and Proper Clause."*̂  (Calabresi, 
Prakash 1994, 582 - 634) Secondly, they rely on various Federalist Papers excerpts to 
clarify the idea that the President was intended to act as a unitary actor. Within this 
framework, they try to prove that the Framers intended that there would be a formal 
separation of powers into three distinct spheres. Their research however, seems to ignore
U.S. Const. Art II, § 1, cl. 1
“In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never 
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never 
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a 
government of laws, and not of men”
SEE both his Morrison and Mistretta dissents
'*° U.S. Const. Art. H, § 1, cl. 1 ( “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States”)
■*’ U.S. Const. Art. n, § 3 (“He shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ...”) 
'*̂  U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“He may require the Opinion, in writing, o f the principal 
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of 
their respective Offices....”)
■*̂ U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which are necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other Powers. . . ”
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the formation of the bureaucratic state in which we now reside. Perhaps, they would 
argue that adherence to the strict formalism that the founders intended would have 
prevented the formation of such a state in the first place, nonetheless, now that the 
condition is upon us, having a judiciary which ignores its existence and the relative lack 
of power that the ‘unitary Executive’ has over them has created a situation in which the 
Court has afforded the bureaucracies more power by not allowing the Congress to help in 
their control and maintenance.(Prakash 1993,1012)
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CHAPTER V
FUNCTIONALISM: THE STRUCTURAL APPOACH TO SEPARATION OF 
POWERS INTERPRETATION
Although formalism has dominated the Benches’ ideology with respect to the 
Separation of Powers Doctrine for at least the last twenty years, there are those both 
inside and outside of the judiciary who view history, the Constitution, and the intended 
role of the Supreme Court quite differently. The model that many of them advocate, 
which can best be called functionalism (Flaherty 1996, p. 1736), which views the 
separation o f powers doctrine as both undeveloped and pragmatic. Like Justice White’s 
dissent in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, functionalists reject the idea that 
there is some global framework that can identify the nature and place of all powers in 
advance. This view does not try to argue against the idea of structure in government; 
rather, it recognizes that the Constitution sets forth “certain fundamental boundaries 
among the three branches, mostly in clear text, and mostly at the highest level”.(Casper 
1997, p. 212) Examples can be seen as follows: only the President can, subject to the 
advise and consent of the Senate, appoint ambassadors and judges to the Supreme 
Courf*'*; Only the Supreme Court, subject to congressional regulation, shall have 
appellate jurisdiction in federal cases.'*^
U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 
U.S. Const. Art. ffl, § 2, cl. 2
86
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Despite these instances, the functional approach is not strictly textual. It is 
concerned with the maintenance of equilibrium in the separation of powers system 
through the control of governmental goals and the devices used to achieve them. In light 
of this, if the goal of Congress were to maintain equilibrium in the system, rather than 
disrupt it through the use of the legislative veto then it should have been found 
Constitutional. Thus, even though the device may have been in violation of some of the 
finer points of the separation of powers doctrine, if its function was to support the 
doctrine, then it would be functionally sound. Before alarms begin to go off shouting that 
the “ends are justifying the means” or that the “tail is wagging the dog”, one must first re­
evaluate original intent in this matter. The formalist sees all devices that are not fully 
congruent with the rigid tripartite division of powers as destructive to the ideal of 
separation of powers; the functionalist is not quite so sure.
In the functionalist schema, the Constitution does not preclude, and may even 
invite, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary to share power in creative ways.
“So long as what emerges does not upset the specified design at the top of the structure, 
and so long as they do not infringe the basic and strongly implied goals of separation of 
powers, whatever emerges is fair game.”(FIaherty 1996, p. 1737) Thus, Congressional 
regulation of the executive can be a valid exercise of power. This is true even if the 
limitation takes “the form of a legislative act short of a statute” (462 U.S. 919 @ 967) as 
was the case in Chadha, or if the regulation “is more like an executive measure 
undertaken by agents answerable to Congress”(478 U.S. 714 @ 760) as in Bowsher.
These appearances are of little regard to functionalists. What matters is whether the
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arrangement undercuts a more fundamental value that the division of powers was meant 
to advance in the first place. This viewpoint is clearly expressed by Justice White in his 
dissent against the formalist reasoning used to decide the Chadha case. Here he writes 
that:
. . .  The Constitution does not directly authorize or prohibit the legislative 
veto. Thus, our task should be to determine whether the legislative veto is 
consistent with the purposes of Art. 1 and the principles of Separation of 
Powers which are reflected in that Article and throughout the Constitution.
We should not find the lack of a specific constitutional authorization for 
the legislative veto surprising, and I would not infer disapproval of the 
mechanism from its absence. From the summer of 1787 to the present the 
government of the United States has become an endeavor far beyond the 
contemplation of the Framers.. . .  But the wisdom of the Framers was to 
anticipate that the nation would grow and new problems of governance 
would require different solutions . . .
He then goes on in that dissent to point out the gaps that the Formalist’s easily definable
and clearly identifiable spheres of authority leave for the bureaucracy to fill. Through a
number of different cases'* ,̂ he shows that the Court’s formalistic analysis provides that
“legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments
without the passage of new legislation.” However, the limitations of Article I are
similarly understood as “forbidding Congress from also reserving a check on legislative
power for itself.” In the end, his analysis shows that the effects of formalism have been
to allow Congress to delegate lawmaking powers to agencies that it does not have the
power to perform itself. Logically, he believes that this could not have been what the
See Tagg Bros. & Morehead v. United States (1930), New York Central Securities 
Corp. V. United States (1932), Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage 
Co. (1933) and FTC v. Gratz (1920).
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Framers intended from separation of powers, nor could it possibly be sound constitutional 
law.
Justice White would agree that the Formalist’s positive reading of the Constitution 
seems to contradict the “structure” structure of the Constitution. These positive analyses 
treat “The separation as an end, but it was designed as a means to prevent usurpation and 
to promote efficiency.” (Haltom 1989, 132) Despite this, the Functionalist view of 
separation of powers has only seen modest victories in comparison to its formalist 
counterpart. However, the fact that it has seen any success at all reinforces the idea that 
there is ambiguity in Court decisions on this issue. More importantly, there is not even a 
definable point that the Court rotates its opinion around. An analysis of functionalist 
Court victories will solidify this argument.
As previously mentioned, Morrison v. Olson*^ was decided in favor of a less 
rigid separation of powers. The decision not only allowed an independent counsel to be 
appointed by a court to perform the Executive function of investigating government 
officials under Title VI of the Ethics of Government Act of 1978, but also allowed that 
this official’s dismissal, being rendered by joint Congressional action, was not an 
unconstitutional limitation of executive authority. This muddying of the waters between 
the spheres demonstrates a turn from Chadha and Bowsher's formalism.
In spite of this apparent change of heart in regard to strict formalism, the 
functionalist perspective was clearly bom long before that decision. The perspective may
46 487 U.S. 654 (1988)
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have emerged from the opinion written by former President and then Chief Justice 
William H. Taft in Myers v. United States'* .̂ This opinion which took a hard 
formalistic approach which gave the President unlimited removal power of all 
government employees on the ground that the President is ultimately responsible for 
seeing that the laws are faithfully executed. In a time when administrative agencies were 
proliferating, the decision threatened the policy making functions of Congress by 
allowing policy to be made though regulations of the bureaucratic agencies. Most 
importantly, the hard stand which was taken by Chief Justice Taft opened a Pandora's 
box on the subject.
From that time on, the Court was pressured to alleviate the potential disaster of 
executive supremacy which loomed from the Myers decision. Arguments that such a 
formalistic reading of the separation of powers doctrine disrupted checks and balances 
while giving the Executive a disproportionate share of the power in government led to the 
unanimous decision in Humphrey's Executor v. United States.^^
In this case, the issue of whether President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the power to 
remove any government official was re-evaluated. Justice Sutherland, speaking for a 
unanimous Court held that an unqualified removal power violated the ‘intent’ of 
separation of powers. He asserted that the commissioner whom the President was trying 
to remove served a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial role, unlike the postmaster in the 
Myers case. Therefore, it would be extralegal for the President to try to remove someone
272 U.S. 52(1926) 
295 U.S. 602(1935)
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from such an office. Side-stepping the fact that they were overturning precedent, the 
Court now established a functionalist precedent that could not logically coexist with that 
from the Myers decision. Thereby, the ambiguity through which the Court today is able 
to use separation of powers at its leisure was bom.
Perhaps the most influential case involving the functionalist viewpoint was that of 
Mistretta v. United States. T h i s  case shows how through functionalism, the overlapping 
of the various spheres of the separation of powers doctrine can benefit both government 
and society. In 1972, an influential federal judge by the name of Marvin E. Frankel made 
a proposal that excited some, yet scared many more. He proposed the formation o f an 
expert rule-making agency that wrote guidelines for criminal sentences. Interest, despite 
the skeptics, was great enough for three states - Minnesota, Washington, and 
Pennsylvania - to adopt sentencing commissions that would set guidelines for criminal 
sentencing in their respective states.(Hirsch, Knapp, Tonry 1987, p. ix) The work of 
these sentencing commissions was applauded by the public and legislators alike as the 
answer to unwarranted disparity in criminal sentencing. With the success of these 
commissions at the state level. Congress enacted the Crime Control Act of 1984, which 
included the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and with it, the United States Sentencing 
Commission:
to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal 
criminal justice system that provide certainty and fairness in 
meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted 
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while 
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences
49 488 U.S. 361(1989)
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when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into 
account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.
28 U.S.C.§ 991(b)(1)(B) (1988)
Thus, the policy of indeterminate sentencing, in which judges had relatively no one to 
answer to in regard to the length of the sentences they imposed, was about to encounter a 
drastic change. With the commission would come a new age of severe restrictions on the 
discretion of both judges and prosecutors with respect to their ability to influence the 
sentences of those accused and/or convicted of crimes.
Although this reform was to be a drastic change for everyone who participated in 
the sentencing process, its concepts were far from new. Mandatory punishments were 
first used in America as the colonial legislatures began to affix penalties to most criminal 
offenses. Moreover, they allowed courts little or no flexibility in regard to the imposition 
of penalties in individual cases. This practice, however, became increasingly rare by the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Most states began to see the rigid colonial sentencing 
schemes as tools of government oppression and thereby, began sentencing reforms.
These reforms often restricted capital punishment, abolished many forms of corporal 
punishment, and made imprisonment the principal method of punishing offenders. Many 
early nineteenth century legislatures set maximum permissible punishments for various 
offenses, depending on the seriousness of the offense. Beyond these maximums, 
sentencing judges were allowed to determine the actual duration o f the sentence on a case 
by case basis. Therefore, the trial judge could impose any sentence that did not exceed
Legislatively determined punishments in British colonial courts included fines, 
whipping, forced labor, the pillory, and death. The French Penal Code of 1791 is another 
example of this.
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the maximum allowable sentence, based on “the nature and aggravation of the offense”. 
With this, the precedent of indeterminate sentencing in America was bom.^’ (Lowenthal 
1993, p.68)
Mandatory punishments disappeared for the next century, until 1926 when the 
state of New York enacted a statute requiring a life sentence for any person convicted of a 
felony offense who had two prior felony convictions. In the years between the world 
wars, most states enacted similar laws aimed at habitual offenders. Most of these 
required courts to impose life sentences for third or fourth time felony convictions.^^
Other than these early recidivist laws, and one provision enacted during the 1950’s, the 
major elements of today’s mandatory sentencing scheme did not begin to surface until the 
1970’s.̂  ̂(Meierhofer 1992, p. 893)
In the early 1970’s, the civil rights battle commanders of the previous decade 
began to focus their attention on inequities within our justice system. It was ( and still is) 
a universally held belief that criminal offenders, with similar criminal histories, who 
committed similar offenses under similar mitigating circumstances, should receive similar 
sentences.(Hirsch, Knapp, Tonry 1987, p. 14) This did not seem to be the case, especially 
for young, black, male offenders. Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence at the 
University of Chicago Law School, went so far as to conclude his 1978 study by saying 
that:
See 1801 New York Laws 58 & 1804 Massachusetts Acts 179,180.
By 1949,43 of the 48 states had enacted habitual offender statutes.
In 1953, California enacted a statute requiring that if a person used a firearm in the 
commission of a felony, the court was to impose a 5 to 10 year sentence on top of the 
sentence for the original offense.
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Obviously, judicial decisions are not made uniformly. Decisions 
are made according to a host of extralegal factors, including the 
age of the offender, his race, and social class. Perhaps the most 
obvious example of (misuse of ) Judicial discretion occurs in the 
handling of persons from minority groups. Blacks in comparison 
to whites, are convicted with lesser evidence and sentenced to 
more severe punishments.
(Tonry, Zimring 1983, p. 116)
Thereby, the most fundamental theme in the indeterminate sentencing scheme that 
begged for reform was the issue of sentence disparity. Legislators were then faced with a 
number of ongoing and serious complaints about the performance of the justice system, 
with racial disparity at the forefront. Additional complaints centered around the goals of 
sentencing. These goals, which include deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and 
rehabilitation,^"* were all failing to be met in the public’s eyes. This created a substantial 
amount of pressure on legislators to make the people of our nation regain confidence in 
our federal judiciary.
All of this leads inevitably back to the theory of just punishment - it is, afrer all, 
where the controversy began. If judges had given out just sentences, our justice system 
would not have been in the turmoil in which it found itself - or so the argument goes. The 
reality is that no two people, let alone judges, have exactly the same concept of justice. 
Without the same concept of exactly what justice is, how could anyone expect them to 
come up with the same sentences under an indeterminate sentencing schema? One must 
understand that as each judge formed his/her opinion of what constituted a just 
punishment and then sentenced under those guidelines, it was inevitable that disparities
These four basic purposes of sentencing are taken from 18 U.S.C. § 3551 & 3553.
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would exist. Solving this problem became a major emphasis of the Sentencing 
Commission.(Hirsch, Knapp, Tonry 1987, p. 6)
In 1984, the legislature identified the preceding problems within our justice 
system as being in dire need of remedy. Without the fundamental knowledge required to 
establish “just” sentencing guidelines, they created an administrative agency to be located 
within the judicial branch, called the United States Sentencing Commission, to establish 
mandatory sentencing guidelines for all federal district court judges to follow. This 
commission was to be made up of seven voting members who serve six year terms and 
who may not serve more than two terms. The members of the Commission are appointed 
by the President, and at least three of them must be federal judges. Their original job 
was to create a set of universal sentencing guidelines that established limited sentencing 
ranges, but within which, judges would still retain some discretion. The guidelines were 
also to provide for upward and downward adjustments to sentences with respect to 
mitigating factors which warranted the adjustment.^^ This project was completed in 
1987 and put into effect.(Hirsch, Knapp, Tonry 1987, pp. 16-18)
At this point the opponents, mainly judges, of sentencing reform made their move. 
Between 1987 and 1989, the sentencing guidelines were found to be unconstitutional over 
a hundred different times by federal district courts. The majority of these findings were 
based on the fact that the Sentencing Commission was a legislative agency, placed in the 
judicial branch, and given the executive powers of enforcement. Many judges thought
55 For a complete list of these adjustments, see 28 U.S.C. § 994.
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this to constitute a clear violation o f Article III of the Constitution and refused to use the 
Sentencing Commissions guidelines.
Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states that “The judicial power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” It was argued by these judges that 
as the Constitution makes no provision for Congress to establish anything within the 
judicial branch other than inferior courts, that the establishment o f the Sentencing 
Commission there was a violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. Therefore, any 
rules made by this organization should be considered null and void by virtue of it being 
an illegal body.(Meierhofer 1992, p. 896) Moreover, many o f these judges felt that the 
establishment of the United States Sentencing Commission was actually a legislative 
“Marbury v. Madison”. They believed that Congress was trying to establish legislative 
supremacy over the judicial branch in one of their most important duties; sentencing. To 
refer back to the words of Learned Hand:
Indeed, it is to be understood that the three “Departments” 
were separate and coequal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian 
nomad, looking up to the heaven of the Electorate, but without any 
mutual dependence. What could be better evidence o f complete 
dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one 
“Department” as to its authority on a given occasion to review and 
reversal by another whose own action was conditioned upon the 
answer to the answer to the same issue? Such a doctrine makes 
supreme the “Department” that has the last word.
(Smith 1995, p. 48)
Not all judges believed this line of reasoning; however, it was sufficient to put doubt in 
their minds about the Guidelines. In order to make sure that they were sentencing in a
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constitutional fashion, the majority of these judges continued with their traditional 
indeterminate sentencing schema, until the matter was resolved by the Supreme 
Court.(Weis 1992, p.829)
In a case argued on October 5,1988, John M. Mistretta^* brought suit against the 
United States challenging the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission. The 
United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri determined that the 
sentencing guidelines were constitutional.®’ Notice of appeal was then filed by MIstretta. 
Prior to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, certiorari was granted by the Supreme 
Court. The case was decided eight to one in favor of the United States and the 
Sentencing Commission. In the opinion of the court, authored by Justice Blackmun, it 
was admitted that the Commission was “ an unusual hybrid in structure and authority”; 
however, it did not “affect the integrity or independence of the judicial branch”. Justice 
Scalia was the sole dissenter on the court, dissenting on the grounds that Article III of the 
Constitution was violated when federal judges served in a policy-making position in the 
executive branch. With this judgment, the Sentencing Guidelines took on the full force 
of law.
The Mistretta case stands as a clear example of an evil that had developed in 
government, which was resolved through an agreement between the executive, the 
judicial, and the legislative branch. Even though this agreement violated the formalistic 
concept of separation of powers, it helped to maintain balance and preserve justice
See 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989)
See 682 F.Supp. 1033, decided by judge J. Sachs.
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through the joint effort. Had Justice Scalia prevailed in his analysis of the case, the 
American people would be stuck with the disparate system of justice that had developed 
over the past two hundred years.
In terms of the historical debate, functionalist analysis is actually more deeply 
rooted than the formalist approach. The functionalists argue that the Founders 
themselves mainly employed a functional approach.(Flaherty 1996, p. 1744) They argue 
this along the lines that the Framers only specified a relationship amongst the branches at 
their respective peaks, therefore, leaving Congress ample room to structure the 
implementation of law below those peaks.(Greene 1994, p. 138) Both Abner Greene and 
Gordon Wood emphasize that the bottom line to the Framers was the idea of balance. 
Moreover, they would have been apt to abandon separation of powers at all but the 
highest positions if that abandonment were necessary to maintain balance. Through the 
use of The Federalist Papers, correspondence from the framers themselves, and other 
primary sources along with the Constitution; their analysis points to the probability that 
separation of powers doctrine is held in much too high regard by those who represent the 
formalist camp. More poignantly, a study of the first years of our nation under the 
Constitution, shows “frequent and robust Congressional involvement in the 
implementation of the laws, including criminal prosecution, the structure of executive 
departments, and opinions and administration.”(Solberg 1990, p. 397) All of this 
evidence points to the idea that the Framers supported a tripartite model of balance rather 
than a strict separation of powers.
A reconstruction of the founding period refutes the formalist claim even more
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dramatically. Analysis of the times show that those who lived in the American political 
world at this time did not share the same definitions of words like “separation of powers”, 
“execute the laws”, or “legislate”; nor did they come to a consensus that a modem day 
formalist can easily identify. Along these lines, one must remember that a young John 
Adams called the English Constitution, “the most perfect combination of human powers 
in society which finite wisdom has yet contrived and reduced to practice for the 
preservation of liberty and the production of happiness.”(Solberg 1990, p. 47) Screaming 
the praises of Montesquieu’s “mixed government” is hardly the same as supporting a 
rigidly structured “separation of powers”.
Finally, it should be noted that the generally agreed upon lack of theoretical 
success with the Articles of Confederation was that there was too much reliance upon 
simple accountability®*, not enough concern for efficiency and little or no sense of 
balance.(Wood 1969, p. 153-54 ) As Willi Paul Adams notes, for the framers 
“Separation of powers served balance rather than balance serving a rigid, formalistic view 
of separation of powers.”( Adams 1980, p. 185) This balance was believed by the 
Framers to signify a move away from the simple accountability which had proven to be so 
dangerous. Under simple accountability, our states saw the rise of legislatures run by 
demagogues, localism, and factions.(Wood 1969, p. 158) As James Madison wrote in a 
privately circulated memorandum entitled Vices o f the Political System o f  the United 
States, “The short period of independence has filled as many pages as the century which 
proceeds it with ill-considered, unjust, and unrepresentative laws.”(Solberg 1990, p. 124)
38 Accountability only to the electorate
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Today’s Supreme Court, which embraces the formalist schema, returns us to the 
idea of simple accountability -  at least in the executive branch. The refusal of the Court, 
in most cases, to allow the transcendence of the legislative and executive spheres for 
functionally sound reasons has allowed bureaucracies to run amuck. Moreover, in a 
masquerade o f maintaining these spheres, the Court has volleyed back and forth between 
the formalists dogma and that of the functionalists. The Judiciary is thereby playing the 
game of the Prince, making the other two branches subservient by keeping them unsure 
about the laws of the land. With the Court’s indecision, the easiest thing for Congress 
and the President to do has been to avoid the issue -  which they have.
As Abraham Lincoln warned in his first inaugural address;
The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the 
government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people is to 
be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court. . .  the 
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having, to that 
extent, practically resigned their government into the hands of that 
eminent tribunal.
(DeHart, Meese 1997, p. 55)
The American people may have become pawns of the federal judiciary and their proxies 
the executive branch bureaucracies. If this is so, it is a flaw that may prove fatal before it 
can be cured.
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court or those who believe in rigid 
formalism act in bad faith. Rather, it suggests how even the purest intentions may lead to 
ill fated paths. In this case, the elimination of a muddling of the branches which had 
occurred since the Framers of that document were actually in political offices has 
increased the power of bureaucracies in our government. Perhaps, these men truly were
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gifted with the power to see into the future. However, the purity of their intentions on 
this issue has not avoided a plethora of problems for American government. Problems, 
moreover, that have no simple solutions.
At the least, our Supreme Court needs to set us back on a path; whether it be the 
formalist path or the functionalist path, they need to make a clear decision. In this vein. 
Conservatives and Liberals alike should take their hats off to Justice Scalia. He, at least, 
has stood rigidly by his formalist viewpoint. An unwavering stance like this would allow 
the Congress and President to know exactly what they are up against so that they can 
attempt to find agreeable solutions. With this matter set aside, the government should be 
able to function with a little less ambiguity and put control back into the hands of the 
original three branches of government.
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HISTORIC PRACTICE and INSTUTIONAL COMPETENCE: HOW THE 
BALANCE OF POWER HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO SHIFT
In Federalist 47, James Madison undertook the job of answering the Anti- 
Federalist Charge that the “the several departments are (not separated but) blended in 
such a manner as to at once destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some 
of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate 
weight o f other parts.”( Wallace Mendelson in Hall 1992, 774) His answer was that 
Montesquieu, the proclaimed “oracle” of separation, did not mean that “departments 
ought to have no partial agency in, or control over, the acts of each other.” (Rossiter 1961, 
301) The benefits of this “blending”, according to Madison, were that along with 
bicameralism and federalism it produced the safety of a checked and balanced system of 
government.
Through historically developed practices, the three branches of our government 
have attempted to provide answers for many of the Constitution’s ambiguities and 
silences. These arrangements have been particularly prevalent in the area of separation of 
powers. Like the proverbial snowball that rolled down a mountain and triggered an 
avalanche, the legislative practice of delegating a  portion of their power to the executive 
has put the Supreme Court in a position of not being able to quell the tide without 
undoing years of precedent.
102
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One would naturally assume that a corollary to the Separation of Powers Doctrine 
would be that one branch of the government would not have the power to delegate its 
particular function to another branch. Moreover, by virtue of their power of judicial 
review, the Supreme Court Justices have the last word short of constitutional amendment 
on the allocation of authority among the three branches of the federal government. Still, 
in 1813 the Supreme Court rolled the snowball that would eventually lead to an avalanche 
of legislative powers being delegated to the executive branch.
The concern that underlies such delegation of powers surfaced as early as the 
Constitutional Convention. Madison moved that the President be authorized “to execute 
such powers (not legislative nor judicial in their nature) as may from time to time be 
delegated by the national Legislature.” (Kammen 1986, 56) The suggestion, however, 
was defeated after an argument that the phrase was “surplusage”. Although Madison was 
defended by Charles Pinckney who argued that it might “serve to prevent doubts and 
misconstructions” along with the delegation of “improper powers”, the motion was 
defeated. (Kammen 1986, 58)
Regardless, the Framers must have thought that Congress would need to delegate 
discretion to the executive, within some limits, even though those limits were not 
explicitly identified. (Fisher 1981,24) Analyses of both early congressional actions and 
the fragmentary case law of the Framers’ generation are consistent with this general 
attitude. Between 1794 and 1810, Congress repeatedly authorized the President to lay or 
remove trade embargoes despite arguments that such power may be an exclusive 
legislative function that could not be delegated. (Fisher 1981, 26). The Supreme Court 
was asked to pass a first judgment on the subject in 1813, when it heard The Brig Aurora
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V. The United S t a t e s . Here, despite the argument that Congress had unconstitutionally 
transferred its legislative power to the President by allowing him to lift embargoes when 
France and England “ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States,” the 
Court upheld the action. Justice Thomas Johnson justified the decision of the Court when 
he stated that “we can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its 
discretion in reviving the statute either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment 
should direct.” (Glennon 1984,109)
Chief Justice Marshall's contribution to the subject of delegation occurred in 
fVayman v. Southarcf^, which involved the delegation of power to the courts rather than 
the executive. The case, which questioned the constitutionality of the portion of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the courts authority to make rules for the conduct of their 
business, was rejected by Marshall. In his opinion he writes that:
It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, 
or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively 
legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others powers which 
the legislature may rightfully exercise itse lf .. . .  The line has not been 
exactly drawn which separates these important subjects, which must be 
entirely regulated by the legislature itself, ft-om those less interested, in 
which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are 
to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.. . .  The 
difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature 
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but the 
maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other 
departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate 
and difficult inquiry, into which a court will not enter unnecessarily.
(23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1 at 42-43,46)
As later cases have shown. The limits of permissible delegation have definitely
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813)
60 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825)
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raised a “delicate and difficult inquiry”. Until well into this century, with the exception 
of the Wayman case, delegation cases all involved direct grants of power to the President 
in the field of foreign relations (Shane and Bruff 1996, 112). The Court has consistently 
upheld legislation that has passed power to the President in this area. This has most 
consistently been related to the argument that because the Presidency enjoys advantages 
in “energy, dispatch, and responsibility,” the executive is more institutionally competent 
to deal with foreign relations. Moreover, the basis of these decisions has been related to 
the historic practice that was established in The Brig Aurora, a practice that has been 
furthered by subsequent delegations and the Court decisions that have upheld them.
The confusion in this area as to the proper separation of powers begins to be 
illuminated by one of its most often quoted cases. Field v. Clark^'. This case questioned 
the constitutionality of a statute that granted the President power to suspend the free 
import of foreign goods if he found that the importing country was not granting American 
goods the same freedom. (Currie 1990,18) For the Court, Justice John Harlan® ,̂ 
delivered an opinion that stated a strict rule: “That Congress cannot delegate legislative 
power to the President is a principal universally recognized as vital to the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.” Despite this, he 
went on to uphold the statute on the grounds that as the President’s role in this instance 
was limited to fact finding and therefore execution: “He was the mere agent of the
143 U.S. 649(1892)
“  This is the Justice John M. Harlan who was appointed by President Hayes and served 
from 1877-1911; not to be confused with the Justice John M. Harlan who was later 
appointed by President Eisenhower.
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lawmaking department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will 
was to take effect.”
This functional distinction between policy-making as a legislative function and 
fact-finding as an executive function clearly does not show distinction within the statute. 
Specifically, the statute called for the President to act when he believed that foreign duties 
were “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.” More than anything else, this decision 
pointed to the fact that a new doctrinal formulation was needed to allow Congress to 
grant substantial policy-making discretion to the growing federal bureaucracy. (Bruff 
1987,493)
By early in this century, that new doctrine was formulated and put into effect by 
the various powers of government. At this point, they shifted to a requirement that 
delegated legislative powers contain “standards” to limit the scope of executive 
discretion. The precedent for this was established in J  fV. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United 
States^^, in which the Court upheld another statute allowing the President to equalize 
tariff rates. Here, the Court held that “if Congress shall lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the (delegee) is directed to conform, such legislative action 
is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” (Wallace Mendelson in Hall 1992,
777)
This “standards requirement” seemed to be an ideal compromise between 
principle and necessity. Since Congress cannot legislate in advance for every eventuality, 
and the executive may have a greater capacity to respond to unfolding events, the rule of
63 276 U.S. 394 (1928)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107
law could be preserved through this requirement. Nevertheless, the Court quickly began 
reducing the “standards requirement” to one that held little meaning. In doing so, it 
approved a series of extremely broad delegations of power to executive agencies. For 
example, the Court allowed railroad regulation under “just and reasonable rates,” 
broadcast licensing in the “public interest, convenience, or necessity,” and trade 
regulation of “unfair methods of competition” (Shane and Bruff 1996,112). Thereby, the 
rule was criticized for lacking teeth; however, the onset of the Great Depression gave it 
some strength as it came to be more strictly enforced.
The first delegation cases of the 1930’s involved the National Industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933 (NIRA), at one time President Roosevelt’s flagship legislation. To 
understand these cases (as with all major cases) they must be viewed in their 
extraordinary historical context. As this particular turn of events is unique in our history, 
it is worth examining in some detail. As the “Hundred Days” came upon our country, it 
was highlighted by the fact that “only at the level of the presidential office were the 
various party interests, the crisscrossing legislative blocs and the bustling bureaucrats, 
given some measure of integration in meeting national problems.” Furthermore, “nothing 
better exemplified this pragmatism -  both in the manner it was drawn up or in its major 
provisions -  than the National Industrial Recovery Act.” (Friedman 1985,128)
The National Recovery Administration (NRA) had it origins with several 
congressmen, working independently to introduce bills that would modify the antitrust 
laws. Their goal was to prevent “unfair and excessive” competition by establishing 
councils in the main sectors of industry, trade, and finance, with some powers of self- 
government. The resulting bill was ambushed by all different kinds of groups, who
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asserted that the antitrust laws must not be relaxed. Some said that the bill was a 
“sellout” to industry, others argued that it regimented industry too much, while still others 
believed that it failed to provide for currency inflation.
The final version, which became law, was a compromise between the various 
groups and theories. Accordingly, industrial councils could draw up codes of fair 
competition, but these had to be approved by the President. These codes were exempted 
from antitrust laws, but monopolistic practices were still prohibited. Having full force of 
law once the President signed them, the codes were enforced by a code authority for each 
industry established as part of the National Recovery Administration. The resulting codes 
were supposed to stop wasteful competition, bring about more orderly pricing and selling 
policies, and establish higher wages, shorter hours and better working conditions.
Roosevelt almost immediately lost control of the NRA. In the first rush of 
industrial enthusiasm, NRA coverage was extended so far that the machinery was nearly 
swamped. Within two years of the delegation of huge policy-making powers to 
businessmen (who may or may not have represented the myriad interests of their 
industries), Roosevelt trimmed the NRA’s powers and limited its jurisdiction. By the 
time the Supreme Court could consider the NRA’s constitutionality, it was near 
administrative and political collapse. (Friedman, 1985, 129-42)
The two cases that resulted fi*om this legislation stand as anomalies in the arena of 
the Supreme Court declaring delegations of power by the legislature to the President 
invalid. It may have required something this bold, expansive and far reaching for the 
Supreme Court to realize how dangerous such delegations could be. Regardless, it was 
against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided the challenges to the NIRA. The
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first involved the NIRA’s attempt to protect the petroleum industry from a flood of newly
discovered oil that was depressing the market. Part of the statute authorized the President
to prohibit interstate transport of petroleum produced in excess of the amount permitted
by any state law.®̂  President Roosevelt issued an executive order prohibiting such “hot
oil”. Oil producers and refiners sought an injimction against the program. In Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan^^ the Supreme Court found that Section 9 ( c ) of the statute was
unconstitutional. Chief Justice Hughes took it upon himself to write the opinion of the
Court; which states:
in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has 
recognized that there are limits on the delegation which there is no 
constitutional authority to transcend. We think that § 9 (c ) goes beyond 
those limits. As to the transportation of oil products in excess of state 
permission, the Congress has declared no policy, established no standard, 
has laid down no rule. . .  If § 9 (c ) were held valid, it would be idle to 
pretend that anything would be left of the limitations upon the power of 
the Congress to delegate its law-making ftmction. . .
In that same session, another challenge to NIRA legislation struck directly at the 
heart of the statute. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States^^ asserted that Section 3 of 
the statute provided that trade associations could promulgate codes of “fair competition,” 
which, upon approval by the President, would have the force of law. The President was 
only authorized to approve the code if he found that the trade association was 
representative of the industry, that the code was not designed to promote monopolies, and 
that the code would carry out the general policies of the Act. A trade group proposed a
Section 9( c ), 48 Stat. 200 (1933) 
*®293 U.S. 388(1935)
295 U.S. 495 (1935)
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“poultry code”; the President approved it; the Schecters were convicted for violating it. 
They subsequently appealed the decision. (Hall 1992, 757)
In another opinion rendered by Chief Justice Hughes, the Supreme Court 
unanimously invalidated the statute, on three grounds. First, that the legislation could not 
be justified on the grounds of a national economic emergency. This was in spite of the 
fact that the Court had recently accepted the claim that the current agricultural emergency 
had justified mortgage relief for Minnesota farmers in Home Building & Loan Assn. V. 
Blaisdelf^; they now held that “extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge 
constitutional power.” It is also important to note that the lone dissenter in the Panama 
Refining Co. case. Justice Cardozo, who had dissented on the grounds that the law had 
been justified by the current economic emergency, now sided with the Court.
Chief Justice Hughes’ second argument was that the statute had once again, as in 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the 
President. In this case, the statute had given industry groups, with the cooperation of the 
President, authority to draft regulations covering the entire economic life of the country. 
Here, on his change of heart, Cardozo noted that “th is . . .  is delegation run riot.”
The third argument that Hughes uses against the statute was that the poultry code 
established regulation of local transactions, not interstate commerce that would be under 
Congressional control. Despite previous rulings that local transactions could be regulated 
by Congress if they had a direct effect on interstate commerce, the Court held that the 
effects cited here would be indirect rather than direct. Despite the difficulty in drawing a
67 290 U.S. 398 (1934)
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line between what was “direct” or “indirect”, the Schechters’ business was so clearly 
local that it would have been difficult for anyone to find their connection to interstate 
commerce. (Wallace Mendelson in Hall 1992, 757)
These two cases established what became known as the "non-delegation 
doctrine”; however, that doctrine stood only in relation to the NIRA and its unique 
provisions. Though this doctrine would raise its head again from time to time, it never 
gained the full force of law. More importantly, it failed to undo two things that its 
predecessors had done. First, it did not establish a reason to abandon the historic practice 
of the previous one hundred years in which the Congress had enjoyed free exercise over 
which powers that it could delegate. Secondly, it failed to prove either that the Congress 
was incapable of deciding which of their powers to delegate or that the President was 
incapable of executing those delegated tasks. With that in mind, it is only appropriate to 
examine how the previous doctrine of little or no judicial interference in Congress’ 
delegation of power to the executive came back into favor.
The process actually began as the Court struggled with the idea o f whether or not 
the delegation of legislative powers was fundamentally different in domestic and foreign 
affairs. Chief Justice Marshall saw no Constitutional distinction between foreign and 
domestic policy. If Congress had the power to enact laws that were necessary and proper 
to carry out its enumerated powers, then it had the power whether or not the subject was 
foreign policy. (Grimes 1955,212) If Marshall were correct, then the Court had to 
struggle with finding a common groimd in which efficient and energetic policy could be 
made to satisfy our foreign policy needs without granting the President too much control 
over domestic policy.
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This dichotomy began just a year after the establishment of the “non-delegation 
doctrine”. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.^, the Court upheld a 
delegation of power to the President to prohibit arms sales to countries that were engaged 
in armed conflict in South America. The case is often quoted as the one that gave 
prerogative power to the President in the area o f foreign affairs. Justice Sutherland’s 
often quoted opinion of the Court expresses their belief that legislation in “the 
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom 
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone 
involved.” This decision, which brings us full circle, back to the arguments for 
“federative” power that both Locke and Montesquieu grappled with, never explains why 
foreign relations should hold such a unique place in their jurisprudence. In looking at the 
decision, one begs to ask the Court to answer why other situations, like domestic 
emergency, may not deserve the same “exceptional” treatment. Regardless, the decision 
virtually reversed the “non-delegation doctrine” that the Justices had themselves 
established. They thus returned the Court to the earlier philosophy of allowing nearly any 
delegation of legislative power by the Congress -  especially in the area of foreign affairs.
Beyond this consequence, in the attempt to maintain a formalist analysis in his 
decision. Justice Sutherland effectively created a separate sphere of authority for the 
President in the realm of foreign affairs. He explains this sphere as “the very delicate, 
plenary, and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government 
in the field of international relations -  a power which does not require as a basis for its 
exercise an act of Congress.” These two portions of the Curtis-Wright decision have
68 299 U.S. 304(1936)
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lifted it up to the status of being an “oracle”. (Adler 1989,160-1) It has led the judiciary 
to defer to “executive judgment” in cases involving executive agreements, travel abroad, 
treaty termination, and the war power.
In 1944, a 6-3 decision by the Court would extend the wholesale ability of 
Congress to delegate their legislative power to the domestic arena. Relying upon “war 
powers” the Court, in Yakus v. United States^^, rejected a delegation challenge to the 
World War 11 price controls that were administered by the Office of Price Administration. 
The opinion by Chief Justice Stone clearly presents the Court’s belief:
That Congress has constitutional authority to prescribe commodity 
prices as a war emergency measure, and that the Act was adopted by 
Congress in the exercise of that power, are not questioned here. . .
Congress enacted the Emergency Price (Control Act in pursuance of 
a defined policy and required that the prices fixed by the Administrator 
should ftuther that policy and conform to standards prescribed by the Act.
The boundaries of the field of the Administrator’s permissible action are 
marked by the statute. It directs that the prices fixed shall effectuate the 
declared policy of the Act to stabilize commodity prices so as to prevent 
war-time inflation and its enumerated disruptive causes and effects. In 
addition the prices must be fair and equitable, and in fixing them the 
Administrator is directed to give due consideration, so far as practicable, 
to prevailing prices during the designated base period, with prescribed 
administrative adjustments to compensate for enumerated disturbing 
factors affecting prices. . .
After justifying the decision on the basis of “war powers” and effectively returning to the
historic practice before the two NIRA cases. Chief Justice Stone then goes on to explain
why the details of this case were different than the ones considered in those earlier cases.
Here he explains that:
The act is unlike the National Industrial Recovery Act considered 
in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, which proclaimed in the 
broadest terms it purpose “to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural
69 321 U.S. 414 (1944)
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resources.” It prescribed no method of attaining that end save by the 
establishment of codes of fair competition, the nature of whose 
permissible provisions was left undefined. It provided no standards to 
which those codes were to conform. The function of formulating the 
codes was delegated, not to a public official responsible to Congress or the 
Executive, but to private individuals engaged in the industries to be 
regulated. . .
At this point, the Chief Justice gets to the main purpose in his argument: to grant the 
legislature the fairly autonomous ability to delegate their power. In doing so, he also 
defines to Court’s purpose in this transaction of power, as being to assure that Congress’ 
goals in delegating power are met by their delegees. In his words:
Acting within its constitutional power to fix prices it is for the 
Congress to say whether the data on the basis of which prices are to be 
fixed are to be confined within a narrow or a broad range. In either case 
the only concern of the courts is to ascertain whether the will of Congress 
has been obeyed. This depends not upon the breadth of the definition of 
the facts or conditions which the administrative officer is to find but upon 
the determination whether the definition sufficiently marks within which 
the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept
within it compliance with the legislative will Only if we could say that
there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator’s 
action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain 
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in 
overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared purpose of 
preventing inflation. The standards prescribed by the present Act, with the 
aid of the “statement of the considerations” required to be made by the 
Administrator, are sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the 
courts and the public to ascertain whether the Administrator, in fixing the 
designated prices, has conformed to those standards.. . .
(Shane and Bruff 1996, 118)
Clearly, the majority of the Court’s reasoning in this case had little reliance on 
congressional war power. Moreover, in countering the Schechter Poultry decision, it set 
the Court back onto the path of using historic practice and institutional competence as the 
basis for its decisions regarding the delegation o f legislative power. Indeed, Yakus 
initiated a string of decisions that rejected challenges to domestic legislation on the basis
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of improper delegation. This trend, in turn, has continued unbroken to the present. 
(Choper 1980, 76)
In the past twenty years, as formalism with respect to the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine has dominated the Bench, two cases have arisen that have cemented the 
legislature’s ability to delegate power. The weight of decisions by Congress to delegate 
such authority has also been increased through another. It is with these three decisions 
and the formalistic decisions already discussed in mind, that the ambiguous nature of 
today’s Separation of Powers Doctrine can truly be seen.
The first of these cases. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadra^^, 
indirectly asked the Congress to be certain that they wanted and/or needed to disperse the 
powers that they were delegating. In overturning the historic practice of a one House 
“legislative veto” over executive department actions, the Court effectively said that once 
a power has been handed out, only the slow and deliberative process of approval by both 
Houses and presentment to the President can return that power to Congress. In 
eliminating Congress’ “check” on their own actions, the Court has quietly asked them to 
cut back on the amount o f legislative power that they were delegating to the executive 
branch and its agencies. In Justice White’s biting dissent in the case, he notes that: 
“restrictions on the scope of the power that could be delegated (by Congress) have 
diminished and all but disappeared.” He adds that this formalistic reading of the 
Constitution was incompatible with the historic practice o f allowing the Congress to 
delegate powers when he notes that the Court’s decision destroyed “an important if not
Previously discussed in pages 75 - 78 of this Thesis.
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indispensable political invention that allows the president and Congress to resolve major 
constitutional policy differences, assures the accountability of independent regulatory 
agencies and preserves Congress’s control over lawmaking.” If the intentions of the 
Supreme Court were to force Congress to decrease the amount of power that it was 
delegating, the Court has failed. More importantly, the outcome of the decision has been 
to allow executive agencies to make policy decisions without being hampered by the 
threat of the legislative veto. This, if anything, has increased the amount of legislative 
power that the bureaucracies are able to wield. (Bruff 1987,518)
In both Morrison v. Olson^' and Mistretta v. United States^' the Court approved 
the creation of positions, located within other branches of the government, which were 
accountable only but remotely to the branches that they were located in. To each of these 
positions (in the case of Mistretta, a board) the Congress delegated substantial powers. 
However, since in both cases, the Act that established the positions set forth adequate 
minimum standards, their creation was upheld. To those who advocate a formal 
separation of powers (like Justice Scalia), both of these creations would appear to be the 
monstrosities of a government that was abandoning the separation of powers altogether. 
However, they also stand as proof that the use of historic practice and institutional
”  487 U.S. 654 (1988) upholding a statute that provided for an independent counsel 
(under the Attorney General) to investigate possible federal criminal violations by senior 
executive officers. This officer was only to be removed for “good cause” by the Attorney 
General.
For a full discussion of Mistretta, see pages 86 - 93 of this Thesis.
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competence hold at least equal weight to the formalistic approach that has arguably 
dominated separation of powers Court decisions over the past two decades.’®
The Supreme Court has not invalidated a Congressional delegation for over half a 
century. It seems obvious that some broad and even careless standards have survived. 
(Shane and Bruff 1996, 127) Primarily, this has been due to the Court’s inability to 
define a sufficient standard for delegation. As it refused to follow the lead of the “New 
Deal” cases, the Justices opened the door for immense policy making authority to be 
transferred to executive agencies. Their inability to reach a consensus on the approach 
that they are using to interpret the Separation of Powers Doctrine has also led to more 
judicial legislating than ever before in our history.
Under present conditions, when Congress delegates without any guidance from 
the courts, the courts usually end up rewriting many of the statutes in the course of 
"construction.” Since the Court’s present procedure is always to try to find an acceptable 
meaning of a statute in order to avoid invalidating it, the Court is legislating constantly. 
Thus, it would seem that a return to the Schechter rule would be more consistent with the 
Court’s general formalistic approach. Such a return would also act as a general Court 
order for the Congress to do their own work. In this scenario, the rule of law would act as 
a restraint upon rather than an expansion of judicial power.
Historically, rule of law, especially statute law, is the essence of positive 
government. (Choper 1980,28) A bureaucracy in the service of a strong and clear statute 
would be more effective than ever before. (O’Toole 1987, 19) Granted, the rule of law
’® For a further example o f the use of historic practice as the basis for decisions in recent 
years, see Touby v. United States 500 U.S. 160 (1991)
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requirement would likely make the framing and passing of some policies more difficult. 
Regardless, it only makes sense that if a program is to be acceptable, its backers should be 
able to reasonably state its purpose and means.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VII
THE VALUES APPROACH AND THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE
Given the ambiguities and unclear intentions that the Framers doctrine of 
separation of powers has presented the Supreme Court, the number of different 
perspectives from which a Justice could logically approach the Doctrine is astounding. 
Not only could the Justices argue that the answers to the questions that the Doctrine poses 
lie purely in text, or in original intent, or the structure of the Constitution, they may also 
argue that the Doctrine is rooted in historic practice, or even in the institutional 
competence of the various branches. Beyond these basic options, they may attempt to 
mix the various approaches into a unique new creation that they think truly gets to the 
heart of the Doctrine. As Philip Bobbitt so eloquently put it in his book. Constitutional 
Fate:
If you were to take a set of colored pencils, assign a separate color to each 
of the kinds of arguments, and mark through passages in an opinion of the 
Supreme Court deciding a constitutional matter, you would probably have
a multi-colored picture when you finished Furthermore, in a multi-
membered panel whose members may prefer different constitutional 
approaches, the negotiated document that wins a majority may, naturally, 
reflect many hues rather than the single bright splash one observes in 
dissents.
If you take up my suggestion and try this sport you will sometimes 
find that there is nevertheless a patch of uncolored text. And you may also 
find that this patch contains expressions of considerable passion and 
conviction, not simply the idling of the judicial machinery that one 
sometimes finds in dictum. It is with those patches that 1 am concerned 
here.
(Bobbitt 1982,94)
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The type of analysis that should be considered here, can be termed ‘‘value based". 
This type of argument is meant to cover a host of effects on interpretation that stem from 
values that the interpreter holds, but that are not necessarily related to one of the more 
conventional methods of constitutional interpretation. These values can, of course, have 
many sources, such as a sense of necessity in a particular situation or a person's own 
political philosophy. The use of such values are not as prevalent in separation of powers 
cases as they are in individual rights cases, where their presence and effects are so oAen 
openly debated. Although their effects and usage may be more obscure, the presence of 
such interpretation deserves merit.
Not surprisingly, value judgments live in the Supreme Court’s efforts to draw the 
line between law and politics. It is here that the Justices may allow outside values to 
creep into their interpretation of a given statute. Furthermore, it is through these values 
that judges often decide exactly which approach to the separation of powers doctrine they 
are going to employ.
Individual Justices continue to engage in debates, traceable to Hamilton and 
Jefferson, over whether there is a strict or loose construction to the Constitution. They 
also struggle between interpretations that concentrate and those that disperse the powers 
o f the national government. Similarly, in defining executive power, the Court is forced to 
weigh the comparative values of rules and discretion. This is particularly true as they 
examine the delegation of legislative power by the Congress to the Executive branch.
The tradeoffs that Justices make to stay true to their values in such situations are often 
complex, yet subtle at the same time. For example, even when they recognize the need 
for discretion, the Court can compensate by implying requirements for legal controls that
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assure accountability. Further, Justices can hide these value judgments in the language of 
textual analysis, historic practice, or undefined powers. In the end, these values are either 
well hidden in acceptable jargon or the Justices who employ them are regarded as 
disreputable. (Shane and Bruff 1996, 14)
Although a cynical commentator could argue that "that is all that real ‘judging’ is 
about,’’ it is more useful to see how such values have been employed in separation of 
powers cases, in particular, their employment in two cases surrounding the Nixon 
administration. The first of these cases. New York Times Co. v. United States'" ,̂ is better 
known as the Pentagon Papers Case. In this 6-3 decision, the division of the Court was 
obvious in that each Justice wrote a separate opinion on the case. It revolved around 
events that began on June 13,1971. On that day, the New York Times published the first 
installment of the “Pentagon Papers,” a classified, seven thousand page document 
commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson’s secretary of defense, Robert McNamara. 
The documents, which had been leaked by a dissident former bureaucrat in the national 
security apparatus, revealed the deception and secrecy that revolved around the Vietnam 
conflict.
Nixon administration officials originally only saw the documents as embarrassing 
to previous administrations. However, with Henry Kissinger as his National Security 
Advisor, Nixon realized that the publication endangered his own policies, patterns of 
secrecy, and credibility. Most importantly, Nixon feared that future Presidents would 
lose control of classified documents like these and potentially embarrass their 
predecessors.
74 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
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The administration thereby secured a lower court order on June 15“’, temporarily 
restraining publication. Three days later, the judge denied a permanent injunction, but a 
circuit court judge blocked publication until the government’s case could be appealed.
On June 25“*, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an expedited appeal on the case. (Stanley 
Kutler in Hall 1992,588)
The government contended that publication of the documents would endanger 
lives, the release o f prisoners of war and the peace process. Through these points, they 
tried to make the argument that without any statutory authorization, the President, in his 
role as commander-in-chief and steward of foreign relations, could create a legal norm of 
secrecy. They further argued that through these roles, he also had the ability to enlist the 
injunctive powers of the federal courts to enforce his norm against publications that posed 
a “grave and irreparable damage” to national security. (Shane and Bruff 1996,672)
The government lawyers, by making this an issue of foreign affairs, caught the 
Court between its general leniency for executive discretion in that arena and its firm stand 
that there must be specific statutory delegation of such power in domestic decisions. This 
is compounded by the fact that as Justice Thurgood Marshall points out: “on at least two 
occasions. Congress (had) refused to enact legislation that would have . . .  given the 
President the power that he sought in that case.” Despite all of this, the Court used 
conventional First Amendment analysis to decide against the permanent injunction that 
the government sought. In somewhat of a triumph in avoidance, the Court clearly ignored 
the textual argument that the First Amendment does not apply to actions of the President. 
(Bobbitt 1982,101)
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Through this decision, the argument can clearly be made that the Court was 
working on a value based interpretation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. Looking at 
the particular functions, and the powers associated with those functions, that had been 
specifically delegated to the President by the Congress seems to be glaringly absent in the 
Court’s decision. The President’s ability to control information collected solely by and 
solely for the Executive reflection and decisionmaking in an area, foreign affairs, largely 
committed to the President, would seem reasonable. Taking into consideration past 
Executive action, there would appear to be a very strong case against using the First 
Amendment as a lever by which to alter the direction of such control and dissemination. 
(Bobbitt 1982,103)
In sum, each Justice used his own value-based interpretation because the case 
raised a novel situation in which no prior doctrine had been established. To avoid 
establishing a doctrine, they failed to explicitly consider the first Amendment’s 
application to the Executive. The result was to simply add more confusion to the 
definition of the proper function of the executive in the separation of powers.
Three years later. President Nixon was once again on the hot seat’. The case of 
United States v. Nixon^^, allows another look at how the values approach can and has 
been used to justify Court decisions. The part of this case that value judgment revolves 
around is the concept of “executive privilege.” More precisely, the claim that was made 
by Nixon’s attorneys that he somehow had the privilege to withhold evidence on the 
grounds that confidential conversations were integral to the President’s decision making 
process and constitutional function. They further argued that the independence of the
” 418 U.S. 684(1974)
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Executive Branch within its own sphere, insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in 
an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential 
communications through the doctrine of separation of powers. (Shane and Bruff 1996, 
297)
This case, in many respects, put the Supreme Court on trial as much as it did
President Nixon. It was asked to not only define the boundaries of Executive and
Legislative function, but were also asked to decide where their own boundary lines were
to be laid. Their response to the arguments for executive privilege is based on the
following assertion:
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national 
security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the 
very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is 
significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera 
inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged to 
provide.
That is, without relying on evidence or precedent, and giving no reasons for avoiding 
either, the Court has determined that presidential confidentiality is not too diminished if 
the only people privileged to intrude upon it are federal district judges. From this 
assessment that the President’s confidentiality would only be slightly damaged by such 
intrusions, the Court moves to explain why this trivial inconvenience is necessary. Chief 
Justice Burger surmises that this inconvenience is being offset by the duty of the Judicial 
Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. As he locates that duty in Article 111, he has 
at once answered both the first and the second objections of the President. Not only is the 
President’s interest in confidentiality outweighed by the interest the Court has in 
achieving a just criminal process, but his claim against the judicial subpoena is answered 
as well.
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This argument, in itself, puts forth a value laced interpretation in that nowhere in 
Article III does it mention such a responsibility of the Court. Moreover, to place it there 
seems to exclude the responsibilities of the state courts, whose primary duty is to do 
justice in criminal prosecutions. The value, however, is explained when he writes that: 
“To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts that 
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the 
prosecution or the defense.” Of course, this statement is either plainly false, since the 
prosecution has never been able to avail itself of compulsory process to get privileged 
material, or it is trivial, since it really means, “except when the evidence is privileged.” 
(Bobbitt 1982,215)
The Court implies in its decision that matters of foreign and defense policy are 
privileged. It also observes that there is no precedent precisely on this point. Later, it 
announces that executive conversations and papers are constitutionally privileged 
materials, but only to the extent that they relate to the effective discharge of the 
President’s powers. Regardless, the Justices believe that to permit such privilege in this 
case would gravely impair the function of the courts: “The Constitutional need for 
production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the . . .  
administration of j ustice.” (Bobbitt 1982,216)
The Constitutional bases that the Court relies on here are in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. These, however, have always been construed to protect defendants rather 
than to be used against them. Even though privilege to information by the defendant 
nearly always makes things more difficult for the prosecution, the Court goes on to say 
that: “without access to certain facts, a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated.”
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Through this position, the Court infers a constitutional right of prosecutors to obtain 
evidence, a right that they further justify by invoking the “due process of law.”
In sum, the Court held that any time a prosecutor reasonably demands the private 
tapes and/or papers of a sitting President, the President must give them to a district judge 
so that their relevancy can be determined. (Bobbitt 1982,217) This decision has clearly 
not been held as precedent, if it were, our current President’s legal problems would have 
been handled much differently. Moreover, such practice would have totally changed the 
process by which presidential decision making takes place.
The preceding argument should not be construed to say that the decision in United 
States V. Nixon was wrong. To the contrary, it was based on the essential American 
constitutional values that we have “a government of laws, not men” and “equal justice 
under the law.” It just goes to show that traditional methods of interpreting the 
Separation of Powers Doctrine, or any other part of our Constitution, are not always the 
most appropriate.
Most importantly. The use of the values approach may be what saves the 
American doctrine of separated powers from becoming obsolete. As strict formalism has 
dominated the jurisprudence of the Court in recent years, many have begun to wonder 
what the future may hold for a doctrine that fails to adequately deal with one of the most 
powerful forces in our government -  the bureaucracy. Others have questioned whether 
the historic practices that have gone along with doctrine have only created a monster, 
based on precedent, that no longer has a place in our government. Still, the Doctrine lives 
on mostly because our Supreme Court Justices have never lost sight of the fundamental 
values that underlie it. Those values, established by the framers of our Constitution as
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“balance” and “accountability”, will allow the doctrine to live. They may even be what 
will allow our government to survive the fate of every other empire that has existed in 
world history.
The framers of our Constitution established much of that document for a relatively 
small and simple nation. They were, however, privileged with enough foresight to 
establish powerful doctrines that could be fruitfully modified by future generations. The 
Separation of Powers Doctrine is but one example of this. Despite much criticism, our 
Courts have not abandoned this doctrine. Nor have they tried to employ it as an iron clad 
and absolute principle. This flexibility in the application o f the Doctrine has indeed 
established shifting soil upon which the great house has been built. 1 would contend here 
that in the same vision as Chief Justice Rehnquist’s “living Constitution,” the Separation 
of Powers doctrine needs to be able to mold itself into a shape that can coexist with 
nature of the times. That shifting foundation, like one built to withstand earthquakes, will 
express the evolving needs and desires of the populous, yet hold the great house together.
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